The Lost Civil War Battle Order
General Robert E Lee and The Lost Order
The Lost Special Order and Dispatch: A Civil War Battle Plan
to Appomattox" By James Longstreet
"The Lost Order"--South Mountain.
How the Federals
found the Dispatch--With every Advantage McClellan "made haste slowly"--Lee turns back to meet him at South Mountain-Longstreet
preferred that the Stand should be made at Sharpsburg--The Battle at the Pass--Many killed--General Garland of the Confederate
and General Reno of the Union side--A future President among the wounded--Estimate of Forces engaged.
THE strange losing and stranger
finding of Lee's "General Order No. 191," commonly referred to as "the lost dispatch," which he had issued September 9 for
the movement of his army, made a difference in our Maryland
campaign for better or for worse.
Before this tell-tale slip of paper found
its way to McClellan's head-quarters he was well advised by his cavalry, and by dispatches wired him from east and west, of
the movements of Lee's army, and later, on that eventful 13th day of September, he received more valuable information, even
to a complete revelation of his adversary's plans and purpose, such as no other commander, in the history of war, has had
at a time so momentous. So well satisfied was he that he was master of the military zodiac that he dispatched the Washington authorities of Lee's "gross mistake" and exposure to severe
penalties. There was not a point upon which he wanted further information nor a plea for a moment of delay. His army was moving
rapidly; all that he wished for was that the plans of the enemy would not be changed. The only change that occurred in the
plans was the delay of their execution, which worked to his greater advantage. By following the operations of the armies through
the complications of the campaign we may form better judgment of the work of the commanders in finding ways through its intricacies:
of the efforts of one to grasp the envied crown so haplessly tendered; of the other in seeking refuge that might cover catastrophe
involved in the complexity of misconceived plans.
The copy of the order that
was lost was sent by General Jackson to General D. H. Hill under the impression that Hill's division was part of his command,
but the division had not been so assigned, and that copy of the order was not delivered at Hill's headquarters, but had been
put to other use. The order sent to General Hill from general headquarters was carefully preserved.
the Federals marched into Frederick, just left by the Confederates,
General Sumner's column went into camp about noon, and it was then that the dispatch was found by Colonel Silas Colgrove,
who took it to division head-quarters, whence it was quickly sent to the Federal commander.
McClellan reported to General Halleck that the lost order had been handed him in the evening, but it is evident that he had
it at the time of his noonday dispatch to the President, from his reference to the facts it exposed.
is possible that it was at first suspected as a ruse de guerre, and that a little time was necessary to convince
McClellan of its genuineness, which may account for the difference between the hinted information in his dispatch to General
Halleck and the confident statement made at noonday to the President.
the Confederates were a little surprised that a matter of such magnitude was intrusted to pen-and-ink dispatches. The copy
sent me was carefully read, then used as some persons use a little cut of tobacco, to be assured that others could not have
the benefit of its contents.
It has been in evidence that the copy that was
lost had been used as a wrapper for three fragrant Confederate cigars in the interim between its importance when issued by
the Confederate chief and its greater importance when found by the Federals.
Halleck thought the capital in imminent peril before he heard from McClellan on the 13th, as shown on that day by a dispatch
to General McClellan:
"The capture of this place
will throw us back six months, if it should not destroy us."
later, the" lost dispatch" having turned up at head-quarters of General McClellan, that commander apprised the authorities
of the true condition of affairs in the following:
FREDERICK, September 13, 1862, 12 M.
("Received 2.35 A.M., September 14.)
"TO THE PRESIDENT:
"I have the whole rebel
force in front of me, but am confident, and no time shall be lost. I have a difficult task to perform, but with God's blessing
will accomplish it. I think Lee has made a gross mistake, and that he will be severely punished for it. The army is in motion
as rapidly as possible. I hope for a great success if the plans of the rebels remain unchanged. We have possession of Catoctin.
I have all the plans of the rebels, and will catch them in their own trap if my men are equal to the emergency. I now feel
that I can count on them as of old. All forces of Pennsylvania should be placed to co-operate
at Chambersburg. My respects to Mrs. Lincoln. Received most enthusiastically by the ladies.
Will send you trophies. All well, and with God's blessing will accomplish it.
"GEO. B. MCCLELLAN."
"FREDERICK CITY, MD.,
September 13, 1862, 11 P.M.
1 P.M., September 14.)
"MAJOR-GENERAL H. W. HALLECK,
order from General R. E. Lee, addressed to General D. H. Hill, which has accidentally come into my hands this evening,--the
authenticity of which is unquestionable,--discloses some of the plans of the enemy, and shows most conclusively that the main
rebel army is now before us, including Longstreet's, Jackson's, the two Hills's, McLaws's, Walker's, R. H. Anderson's, and
Hood's commands. That army was ordered to march on the 10th, and to attack and capture our forces at Harper's Ferry and Martinsburg
yesterday, by surrounding them with such a heavy force that they conceived it impossible they could escape. They were also
ordered to take possession of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad;
afterwards to concentrate again at Boonsborough or Hagerstown.
That this was the plan of campaign on the 9th is confirmed by the fact that heavy firing has been heard in the direction of
Harper's Ferry this afternoon, and the columns took the roads specified in the order. It may, therefore, in my judgment, be
regarded as certain that this rebel army, which I have good reasons for believing amounts to 120,000 men or more, and know
to be commanded by Lee in person, intended to attempt penetrating Pennsylvania. The officers told their friends here that
they were going to Harrisburg and Philadelphia.
My advance has pushed forward to-day and overtaken the enemy on the Middletown
and Harper's Ferry roads, and several slight engagements have taken place, in which our troops have driven the enemy from
their position. A train of wagons, about three-quarters of a mile long, was destroyed to-day by the rebels in their flight.
We took over fifty prisoners. This army marches forward early to-morrow morning, and will make forced marches, to endeavor
to relieve Colonel Miles, but I fear, unless he makes a stout resistance, we may be too late.
report came in just this moment that Miles was attacked to-day, and repulsed the enemy, but I do not know what credit to attach
to the statement. I shall do everything in my power to save Miles if he still holds out. Portions of Burnside's and Franklin's
corps move forward this evening.
have received your dispatch of ten A.M. You will perceive, from what I have stated, that there is but little probability of
the enemy being in much force south of the Potomac. I do not, by any means, wish to be understood
as undervaluing the importance of holding Washington. It
is of great consequence, but upon the success of this army the fate of the nation depends. It was for this reason that I said
everything else should be made subordinate to placing this army in proper condition to meet the large rebel force in our front.
Unless General Lee has changed his plans, I expect a severe general engagement to-morrow. I feel confident that there is now
no rebel force immediately threatening Washington or Baltimore, but that I have the mass of their troops to contend with,
and they outnumber me when united.
With the knowledge afforded
by securing Lee's "lost order" the passes of the South Mountain became important points. If he could force them, McClellan might fall on the
divided columns of the Confederates and reach Harper's Ferry in time to save its garrison; but Lee received intelligence of
his only moderate forward movement, and, without knowing then how it came to be made, recalled a force to make resistance,
and, so supplementing or complementing by his rapid moves the Federal commander's slowness, saved his campaign from the disastrous
failure that threatened it.
General McClellan claimed to have been more vigorous
in pursuit after he received the "lost dispatch," but events do not support the claim. He had time after the dispatch was
handed him to march his army to the foot of South Mountain before night, but gave no orders, except his letter to General Franklin calling
for vigorous action, which was afterwards tempered by caution to wait for developments at Turner's Pass. He gave no intimation
of the dispatch to his cavalry leader, who should have been the first to be advised of the points in his possession. General
Pleasonton had pushed the Confederate cavalry back into the mountains long before night of the 13th under his instructions
of the 12th. Had he been informed of the points known by his chief in the afternoon, he would have occupied South Mountain at Turner's Pass before any
of the Confederate infantry was there or apprised of his approach. General McClellan's orders for the 14th were dated,--
13th, 6.45 P.M., Couch to move to Jefferson with his whole division, and
8.45 P.M., Sumner to move at seven A.M.
13th, 11.30 P.M., Hooker to march at daylight to Middletown.
13th, 11.30 P.M., Sykes to move at six A.M., after Hooker on the
Middletown and Hagerstown road.
14th, one A.M., artillery reserve to follow Sykes closely.
14th, nine A.M., Sumner ordered to take
the Shockstown road to Middletown.
Franklin's corps at Buckeystown to march for Burkittsville.
wrote General Franklin at 6.20 P.M., giving the substance of information of the dispatch, but not mentioning when or how he
came by it, and ordered him to march for the mountain pass at Crampton's Gap, to seize the pass if it was not strongly guarded,
and march for Rohrersville, to cut off the command under McLaws about Maryland Heights, capture it, and relieve the garrison
at Harper's Ferry, and return to co-operate in capturing the balance of the Confederate army north of the Potomac; but, in
case the gap was occupied by a strong force, to await operations against it until he heard the engagement of the army moving
upon Turner's Pass. He wrote General Franklin that General Pleasonton had cleared the field east of the mountain of Confederate cavalry. After relieving
Harper's Ferry, Franklin was to destroy bridges and guard
against crossing of the Confederates to the north side, his idea being to cut the Confederate army in two and capture or break
it up in detail. His appeal was urgent for the best work that a general could exercise. The division under General Couch was
ordered to General Franklin, without waiting for all of its forces to join. This is the only order of the records that indicates
unusual action on the part of the Union commander, and General Franklin's evidence before the Committee on the Conduct of
the War shows that his orders of the 13th were so modified on the 14th as to direct his wait for Couch's division to join
him, and the division joined him after nightfall.
The divisions of the Ninth
Corps reached Middletown on the 13th, under the orders of the 12th, issued before the lost dispatch was found, one of them
supporting Pleasonton's cavalry; but Rodman's, under misconception of orders, marched back towards Frederick.
Mountain range, standing between the armies, courses across Maryland
northeast and southwest. Its average height is one thousand feet; its rugged passes give it strong military features. The
pass at Turner drops off about four hundred feet. About a mile south of this the old Sharpsburg
road crosses at a greater elevation through rugged windings; a fork of this road, on the mountain-side, makes a second way
over below Fox's Pass, while another turns to the right and leads back into the turnpike at the summit, or Mountain House.
On the north side of the turnpike a road leads off to the right, called the
old Hagerstown road, which winds its course through a valley
between a spur and the mountain, and courses back to the turnpike along the top. A more rugged route than this opens a way
to the mountain-top by a route nearer the pike.
General Pleasonton, not advised
of the lost dispatch, did not push for a careful reconnaissance on the 13th. At the same time, General Stuart, forced back
into the mountains, finding his cavalry unserviceable, advised General D. H. Hill of severe pressure, called for a brigade
of infantry, ordered Hampton's cavalry down to Cramp-ton's Pass to assist Robertson's brigade, Colonel Munford commanding,
leaving the Jeff Davis Legion, under Colonel Martin, Colonel Rosser with another cavalry detachment, and Stuart's horse artillery
to occupy the passes by the old Sharpsburg road. Colquitt's brigade of infantry reported to him under his call. After posting
it near the east base of the mountain to hold the pass, he rode to join his other cavalry detachments down at Crampton's Pass.
He only knew of two brigades of infantry pressing him back, and so reported. His cavalry, ordered around the Union
right under General Fitzhugh Lee, for information of the force in his front, had failed to make report. General Hill ordered
two brigades, Garland's and Colquitt's, into the pass to report
to Stuart, and drew his other three near the foot of the mountain. Garland's
brigade filed to the right after ascending the mountain, and halted near the turnpike. Colquitt's brigade took its position
across the turnpike and down towards the base of the mountain, Lane's batteries at the summit.
seems that up to the night of the 13th most of the Confederates were looking with confidence to the surrender at Harper's
Ferry on the 13th, to be promptly followed by a move farther west, not thinking it possible that a great struggle at and along
the range of South Mountain was impending; that even on the 14th our cavalry leader thought to continue his retrograde that
day. General Hill's attention was given more to his instructions to prevent the escape of fugitives from Harper's Ferry than
to trouble along his front, as the instructions covered more especially that duty, while information from the cavalry gave
no indication of serious trouble from the front.
A little after dark of the
13th, General Lee received, through a scout, information of the advance of the Union forces to the foot of South Mountain in solid ranks. Later information
confirmed this report, giving the estimated strength at ninety thousand. General Lee still held to the thought that he had
ample time. He sent for me, and I found him over his map. He told of the reports, and asked my views. I thought it too late
to march on the 14th and properly man the pass at Turner's, and expressed preference for concentrating D. H. Hill's and my
own force behind the Antietam at Sharpsburg, where we could get together in season to make a strong defensive fight, and at
the same time check McClellan's march towards Harper's Ferry, in case he thought to relieve the beleaguered garrison by that
route, forcing him to first remove the obstacle on his flank. He preferred to make the stand at Turner's Pass, and ordered
the troops to march next morning, ordering a brigade left at Hagerstown
to guard the trains. No warning was sent McLaws to prepare to defend his rear, either by the commanding general or by the
chief of cavalry. The hallucination that McClellan was not capable of serious work seemed to pervade our army, even to this
moment of dreadful threatening.
After retiring to my couch, reflecting upon
affairs, my mind was so disturbed that I could not rest. As I studied, the perils seemed to grow, till at last I made a light
and wrote to tell General Lee of my troubled thoughts, and appealed again for immediate concentration at Sharpsburg. To this no answer came, but it relieved my mind and gave me some rest.
daylight in the morning the column marched (eight brigades with the artillery), leaving Toombs's brigade. A regiment of G.
T. Anderson's that had been on guard all night was not relieved in time to join the march, and remained with Toombs. The day
was hot and the roads dry and beaten into impalpable powder, that rose in clouds of dust from under our feet as we marched.
Before sunrise of the 14th, General Hill rode to the top of the mountain to
view the front to which his brigade had been called the day before. As he rode he received a message from General Stuart,
informing him that he had sent his main cavalry force to Crampton's Pass, and was then en route to join it. He found
Garland's brigade at the summit, near the Mountain House,
on the right of the road, and Colquitt's well advanced down the east side. He withdrew the latter to the summit, and posted
two regiments on the north side of the pike behind stone walls, the others on the south side under cover of a woodland. Upon
learning of the approaches to his position, he ordered the brigade under G. B. Anderson and one of Ripley's regiments up,
leaving Rodes's brigade and the balance of Ripley's to watch for refugees from Harper's Ferry.
he was withdrawing and posting Colquitt's brigade, General Pleasonton was marching by the road three-fourths of a mile south,
feeling his way towards Fox's Gap, with the brigade of infantry under Colonel Scammon. Co-operating with this advance, Pleasonton
used his cavalry along the turnpike. His batteries were put in action near the foot of the mountain, except one section of
McMullen's under Lieutenant Crome, which advanced with the infantry. The battle was thus opened by General Pleasonton and
General Cox without orders, and without information of the lost dispatch. The latter had the foresight to support this move
with his brigade under Colonel Crook. Batteries of twenty-pound Parrott guns were posted near the foot of the mountain in
fine position to open upon the Confederates at the summit.
After posting Colquitt's
brigade, General Hill rode off to his right to examine the approach to Fox's Gap, near the point held by Rosser's cavalry
and horse artillery. As he passed near the gap he heard noise of troops working their way towards him, and soon artillery
opened fire across the gap over his head. He hurried back and sent Garland's
brigade, with Bondurant's battery, to meet the approaching enemy. Garland made connection with Rosser's detachment and engaged
in severe skirmish, arresting the progress of Scammon's brigade till the coming of Crook's, when Cox gave new force to his
fight, and after a severe contest, in which Garland fell, the division advanced in a gallant charge, which broke the ranks
of the brigade, discomfited by the loss of its gallant leader, part of it breaking in confusion down the mountain, the left
withdrawing towards the turnpike. G. B. Anderson's brigade was in time to check this success and hold for reinforcements.
Ripley's brigade, called up later, came, but passed to the right and beyond the fight. General Hill had posted two batteries
on the summit north of the turnpike, which had a destructive cross fire on Cox as he made his fight, and part of Colquitt's
right regiments were put in, in aid of G. B. Anderson's men. About two P.M., General Cox was reinforced by the division under
General Wilcox, and a little after three o'clock by Sturgis's division, the corps commander, General Reno, taking command
with his last division under Rodman.
As Sturgis's division came into the fight,
the head of my column reached the top of the pass, where the brigades of G. T. Anderson and Drayton, under General D. R. Jones,
filed to the right to meet the battle, and soon after General Hood with two brigades. The last reinforcement braced the Confederate
fight to a successful stand, and held it till after night in hot contest, in which many brave soldiers and valuable officers
were lost on both sides.
The fight was between eight brigades on the Union side,
with a detachment of cavalry and superior artillery attachments, against two of D. H. Hill's and four of my brigades, with
Rosser's detachment of cavalry and artillery. Ripley's brigade of Hill's division marched for the fight, but lost its direction
and failed to engage. The Confederate batteries made handsome combat, but were of inferior metal and munitions. Numerically,
the Union brigades were stronger than the Confederates, mine having lost more than half its numbers by the wayside, from exhaustion
under its forced march. It seems that several brigades failed to connect closely with the action. Ripley's, on the Confederate
side, General Hill said, "didn't pull a trigger." G. T. Anderson claimed that some of his skirmishers pulled a few triggers,
while Harland's Union brigade of Rodman's division seems to have had little use for its guns. Lieutenant Crome brought a section
of McMullen's battery up in close connection with Cox's advance, put it in, and held it in gallant action till his gunners
were reduced to the minimum of working force, when he took the place of cannoneer and fought till mortally wounded.
the Union side the officers had their time to organize and place their battle, and showed skill in their work. The Confederates
had to meet the battle, as it was called, after its opening, on Rosser's detachment. The lamented Garland, equal to any emergency, was quick enough to get his fine brigade in, and made excellent
battle, till his men, discouraged by the loss of their chief, were overcome by the gallant assault under Cox. General Reno,
on the Union side, an officer of high character and attainments, was killed about seven o'clock P.M. Among the Union wounded
was Colonel Rutherford B. Hayes, afterwards President of the United States.
The pass by the lower trail, old Sharpsburg
road, was opened by this fight, but the Confederates standing so close upon it made it necessary that they should be dislodged
before it could be utilized.
The First Corps marched from the Monocacy at daylight
and approached the mountain at one P.M. General Hooker had three divisions, under Generals Hatch, Ricketts, and Meade. General
Hatch had four brigades, Generals Ricketts and Meade three each, with full artillery appointments. At two o'clock, General
Hooker was ordered north of the turnpike to make a diversion in favor of the troops operating on the south side under General
Reno. Meade's division was marched, followed by Hatch's and Ricketts's,--Meade's on the right, Hatch on Meade's left, Ricketts
in reserve. Meade's division was deployed along the foot-hills. A cavalry regiment under Colonel Williams, First Massachusetts,
was sent to the far right in observation. Meade's advance was followed by Hatch and Ricketts.
Hill's only available force to meet this formidable move was his brigade under General Rodes. He ordered Rodes to his left
to a prominent position about a mile off which commanded that part of the field. Cutts's battalion of artillery had been posted
on the left of the turnpike, to cover by its fire the route just assigned for Hooker's march. The weight of the attack fell
upon Rodes's brigade, and was handsomely received. Evans's brigade, fortunately, came up, and was sent to General Hill, who
ordered it out to connect with Rodes's right. Before making close connection it became engaged, and operated near Rodes's
right, connecting with his fight and dropping back as the troops on his left were gradually forced from point to point.
the brigades under Generals Kemper, Garnett, and Colonel Walker (Jenkins's brigade) approached the mountain, a report reached
general head-quarters that the enemy was forcing his way down the mountain by the old Sharpsburg
road. To meet this General Lee ordered those brigades to the right, and they marched a mile and more down a rugged way along
the base of the mountain before the report was found to be erroneous, when the brigades were ordered back to make their way
to the pike and to the top of the mountain in double time. General Rodes had five regiments, one of which he left to partially
cover the wide opening between his position and the turnpike. In view of the great force approaching to attack him his fight
seemed almost hopeless, but he handled his troops with skill, and delayed the enemy, with the little help that finally came,
till night, breaking from time to time as he was forced nearer our center at the turnpike.
brigade had been called from Hooker's corps, and was ordered up the mountain by the direct route as the corps engaged in its
fight farther off on the right.
A spur of the mountain trends towards the east,
opening a valley between it and the mountain. Through this valley and over the rising ground Meade's division advanced and
made successful attack as he encountered the Confederates. Cooper's battery marched, and assisted in the several attacks as
they were pushed up the mountain slope. The ground was very rough, and the Confederates worked hard to make it too rough,
but the divisions, with their strong lines of skirmishers, made progress. Rodes made an effort to turn the right of the advancing
divisions, but Hooker put out a brigade from Hatch's division, which pushed off the feeble effort, and Rodes lost his first
It was near night when the brigades under Generals Kemper and Garnett
and Colonel Walker returned from their march down the foot of the mountain and reached the top. They were put in as they arrived
to try to cover the right of Rodes and Evans and fill the intervening space to the turnpike. As they marched, the men dropped
along the road, as rapidly as if under severe skirmish. So manifest was it that nature was exhausted, that no one urged them
to get up and try to keep their ranks. As the brigades were led to places along the line, the divisions of Hatch and Ricketts
were advancing; the former, in range, caught the brigades under fire before their lines were formed. At the same time Meade's
division was forcing Rodes and Evans from their positions, back towards the turnpike.
McClellan claimed fifteen hundred prisoners taken by his troops, and that our loss in killed and wounded was greater than
his own, which was fifteen hundred. He estimated the forces as about equal, thirty thousand each. General D. H. Hill does
not admit that the Confederates had more than nine thousand.
have been made to correctly report the numerical strength of my column, some erroneously including the brigades detached with
R. H. Anderson's, and others the brigade of General Toombs and the regiment of G. T. Anderson's brigade, that were left at
Hagerstown. General Hill concedes reluctantly that four thousand of my men came to his support in detachments, but does not
know how to estimate the loss. Considering the severe forced march, the five brigades that made direct ascent of the mountain
were in good order. The three that marched south of the turnpike, along a narrow mountain trail part of the way, through woodlands
and over boulders, returning, then up the mountain, the last march at double time, were thinned to skeletons of three or four
hundred men to a brigade when they reached the Mountain House. That they succeeded in covering enough of the position to conceal
our retreat after night is sufficient encomium of their valorous spirit. (Continue to Special Orders No. 191.)
(Related reading below.)
Reading: The Antietam Campaign (Military Campaigns of the
Civil War). Description: The
Maryland campaign of September 1862 ranks among the most
important military operations of the American Civil War. Crucial political, diplomatic, and military issues were at stake
as Robert E. Lee and George B. McClellan maneuvered and fought in the western part of the state. The climactic clash came
on September 17 at the battle of Antietam, where more than 23,000 men fell in the single
bloodiest day of the war. Continued below.
topics related to Lee's and McClellan's operations from a variety of perspectives, numerous contributors to this volume explore
questions regarding military leadership, strategy, and tactics, the impact of the fighting on officers and soldiers in both
armies, and the ways in which participants and people behind the lines interpreted and remembered the campaign. They also
discuss the performance of untried military units and offer a look at how the United States Army used the Antietam battlefield
as an outdoor classroom for its officers in the early twentieth century. Also available in paperback: The Antietam Campaign (Military Campaigns of the Civil War)
Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam, by Stephen W. Sears. Description: The
Civil War battle waged on September 17, 1862, at Antietam Creek, Maryland, was one of the bloodiest in the nation's history: in this single day, the war
claimed nearly 23,000 casualties. In Landscape Turned Red, the renowned historian Stephen Sears draws on a remarkable cache
of diaries, dispatches, and letters to recreate the vivid drama of Antietam as experienced not only by its leaders but also
by its soldiers, both Union and Confederate. Combining brilliant military analysis with narrative
history of enormous power, Landscape Turned Red is the definitive work on this climactic and bitter struggle. Continued below.
About the Author: STEPHEN W. SEARS is the author of many award-winning books on the Civil War, including
Gettysburg and Landscape
Turned Red. The New York Times Book Review has called him "arguably the preeminent living historian of the war's eastern theater."
He is a former editor for American Heritage.
Pick: The Maryland Campaign of September 1862: Ezra A. Carman's Definitive
Study of the Union and Confederate Armies at Antietam (Hardcover). Description: Completed
in the early 1900s, The Maryland Campaign of September 1862
is still the essential source for anyone seeking understanding of the bloodiest day in all of American history. As the U.S.
War Department’s official expert on the Battle of Antietam, Ezra Carman corresponded with and interviewed hundreds of
other veterans from both sides of the conflict to produce a comprehensive history of the campaign that dashed the Confederacy’s
best hope for independence and ushered in the Emancipation Proclamation. Nearly a century after its completion, Carman's manuscript
has finally made its way into print, in an edition painstakingly edited, annotated, and indexed by Joseph Pierro. The Maryland Campaign of September 1862 is a crucial document for anyone
interested in delving below the surface of the military campaign that forever altered the course of American history. Continued
Alexander, Chief Historian, Antietam
Ezra Carman manuscript is the definitive study of that bloody September day in 1862. By editing it Joseph Pierro has done
a tremendous service to the field of Civil War studies. Indeed, this work is one of the most important Civil War publications
to come out in decades."
M. McPherson, author of Crossroads of Freedom: Antietam
accounts of Civil War battles were written in the decades after the war by soldiers who had participated in them. None rivals
in accuracy and thoroughness Ezra Carmen's study of the battles of South Mountain and Antietam, in which he fought as colonel of the 13th New Jersey. Students of the 1862 Maryland
campaign have long relied on this manuscript as a vital source; Joseph Pierro's scrupulous editorial work has now made this
detailed narrative accessible to everyone. A splendid achievement."
D. Wert, author of The Sword Of Lincoln: The Army of the Potomac
last, after a century, Ezra A. Carman's The Maryland Campaign
of September 1862 has received the attention it deserves. A Union veteran, Carman authored a remarkable primary study of the
critical operations that ended along Antietam Creek. Editor Joseph Pierro has given students of the Civil War and American
history a most welcome and long overdue book."
C. Bearss, author of Fields of Honor: Pivotal Battles of the Civil War
introduction to the Ezra A. Carman Papers at the Library of Congress and National Archives came in the spring of 1961. I was
astounded and amazed by their depth and scope. The correspondence, troop movement maps, etc, along with Carman's unpublished
manuscript on the Antietam Campaign constitutes then as now an invaluable legacy to the American people by Carman and the
veterans of Antietam. But for too long that resource has only been available to the general public as microfilm or by traveling
to Washington. Now thanks to the publishers and skilled,
knowledgeable, sympathetic, but light-handed editor Joseph Pierro, an annotated copy of Carman's masterpiece The Maryland Campaign of September 1862 will be available to the public."
C. Davis, author of Look Away! A History of the Confederate States of America
Pierro brings into the open one of the great and largely unknown masterworks of Civil War history. Ezra Carman's work on Antietam
is a fountainhead for study of that pivotal battle, written by a man who was in the fight and who spent most of his life studying
and marking the battlefield. No student can afford to ignore this stunningly thorough and brilliantly edited classic."
Recommended Reading: Antietam, South Mountain,
and Harpers Ferry: A Battlefield Guide (This Hallowed Ground: Guides to Civil
War) (Paperback). Description: In September 1862 the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia and the Union Army of the Potomac conducted one of the truly great campaigns of the Civil War. At South
Mountain, Harpers Ferry, and Antietam, North and
South clashed in engagements whose magnitude and importance would earn this campaign a distinguished place in American military
history. The siege of Harpers Ferry produced the largest surrender of U.S.
troops in the nation’s history until World War II, while the day-long battle at Antietam
on September 17 still holds the distinction of being the single bloodiest day of combat in American history. Continued below…
This invaluable book provides
a clear, convenient, stop-by-stop guide to the sites in Maryland and West Virginia associated with the Antietam
campaign, including excursions to Harpers Ferry and South Mountain. Thorough descriptions and analyses, augmented with vignettes and numerous
maps, convey the mechanics as well as the human experience of the campaign, making this book the perfect companion for both
serious students of the Civil War and casual visitors to its battlefields. "Insightful and informed, written in a graceful
style, with excellent maps, Antietam, South Mountain, and Harpers Ferry: A Battlefield Guide will be an invaluable resource
for the Civil War aficionado, as well as the casual visitor to the battlefield."-Edwin C. Bearss, chief historian emeritus
of the National Park Service. About the Author: Ethan S. Rafuse is an associate professor of military history at the U.S.
Army Command and General Staff College. He is the author of several books, including McClellan’s War: The Failure of
Moderation in the Struggle for the Union, and is the coeditor of The Ongoing Civil War: New
Versions of Old Stories.
Recommended Viewing: The American Civil War (DVD Megaset)
(2009) (A&E Television Networks-The History Channel) (14 DVDs) (1697 minutes) (28 Hours 17 Minutes
+ extras). Experience for yourself the historical and personal impact of the Civil War in a way that only HISTORY
can present in this moving megaset™, filled with over 28 hours of American Civil War content. This
MEGASET is the most comprehensive American Civil War compilation to date and is the mother of all Civil War documentaries.
A multifaceted look at “The War Between the States,” this definitive collection brings the most legendary Civil
War battles, and the soldiers and leaders who fought them, vividly to life. From Gettysburg and Antietam to Shiloh, and led
by the likes of Sherman, McClellan, Grant, Beauregard, Lee, Davis, and Jackson, delve into the full military and political
contexts of these men, their armies, and the clashes between them. Continued below...
Almost 150 years after Lee’s surrender at Appomattox Court House,
the unexpected secrets and little-known stories from Civil War history are divulged with fascinating detail. Cutting-edge
CGI and accurate dramatizations illustrate archival letters and original diary entries, and the country’s most renowned
historians describe the less familiar incidents that add perspective and depth to the war that divided a nation. If the DVDs
in this Megaset were purchased separately, it could cost hundreds of dollars. This one-of-a-kind compilation belongs on the
shelf of every Civil War buff, and if you know anyone that is interested in the most costliest and bloodiest war in American
history, buy this, they will love it.
THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR contains the following programs:
* The Most Daring Mission Of The Civil War
* April 1865
Detectives: The Civil War (3 Episodes): Antietam, Gettysburg, Shiloh
* Secret Missions Of The Civil War
* The Lost Battle
Of The Civil War
* Tales Of The Gun: Guns Of The Civil War
* Eighty Acres Of Hell
* Investigating History:
Lincoln: Man Or Myth
* Man, Moment, Machine: Lincoln & The Flying, Spying Machine
* Conspiracy?: Lincoln Assassination
High Tech Lincoln
* Sherman’s March
* The Hunt For John Wilkes Booth
* Civil War Combat (4 Episodes): The Hornets’
Nest At Shiloh, The Bloody Lane At Antietam, The Wheatfield At Gettysburg, The Tragedy At Cold Harbor
* Civil War Journal
(8 Episodes): John Brown's War, Destiny At Fort Sumter, The Battle of 1st Bull Run, The 54th Massachusetts, West Point Classmates—Civil
War Enemies, Robert E. Lee, Stonewall Jackson, Sherman And The March To The Sea
* Full-Length Documentary “Save Our History: Sherman’s Total
* Behind the Scenes Featurettes for “Sherman’s March” and “Lincoln”