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Shiloh Campaign, Tennessee
Accounts
and reports:
Shiloh
Campaign, Tennessee
Apr 6, 1862 to Apr 7, 1862
The campaign and battle of Shiloh are the hardest of all
the campaigns and
battles of the Civil War for the student to
solve-to sift the truth from; the hardest of them all in which to
place
the little credit that can be found in the generalship
on either side upon the proper commanders; the hardest of them
all in which to fix the blame for mistakes. It is not hard for
the student to find abundant faults; it is only hard
for him to
fix the responsibility for them. And this all arises from the
fact that the generals on each side have
fought more bitterly
with the pen, among themselves, since the great battle, than they
fought, side by side, against
their common foe, during the
battle. Grant and Buell have contradicted each other inessential
particulars on one side;
on the other Beauregard and the friends
of Johnston have carried on a bitter controversy. About all
the
student can do is to follow the actual operations as nearly as
possible and determine for himself wherein they
were right and
wherein they were wrong, without trying to place credit or blame
upon individuals.
Napoleon's
Twenty-seventh Maxim says: ''When an army is driven
from a first position the retreating columns should always rally
sufficiently
in rear, to prevent any interruption from the enemy.
The greatest disaster that can happen is when the columns are
attacked
in detail.'' This maxim fitted the case of Johnston's
army
after it was split in two by the fall of Forts Henry and
Donelson and the loss of the direct line of communication between
its wings. If General Johnston fully appreciated the importance
of reuniting the wings of his army ''sufficiently
in rear,'' and as
quickly as possible, he certainly did not show his appreciation
by prompt action. There was no way
for him to bring his two
separated wings together except to retreat with his own (the
right wing) to the south of
the Tennessee River. He reached
Murfreesboro in his retreat
from Nashville about the 20th of
February, but he did not start from there for Corinth until the
28th of February. In tarrying for more than a
week at
Murfreesboro, Johnston,
no doubt, was influenced by the state of
the public mind. Already he had lost Forts Henry and Donelson,
the Tennessee and the Cumberland Rivers,
his hold upon Kentucky,
and the important town of Nashville.
To retreat farther was to
surrender the whole of Middle Tennessee to the enemy. The
newspapers of the South were all
decrying him as a failure, and
State delegations were demanding his removal.
After leaving Murfreesboro Johnston's
army made the march to
Corinth, by way of Decatur
as rapidly as practicable under the
circumstances. The roads were terribly bad, and the streams all
swollen; the distance
was something less than 250 miles, and the
head of the column reached Corinth on the 18th of March, having
averaged
about fourteen miles a day.
For eight or ten days after the fall of Fort Donelson General
Halleck does not appear
to have had in mind any definite and
comprehensive plan of operations. ''I must have commend of the
armies in the
West,'' he wrote to the Secretary of War on the 19th
and 20th of February,-meaning Buell's army in particular,-''and I
will split secession in twain in one month.'' How he meant to go
about it does not appear. It is plain, however, that
he had no
thought of destroying Johnston's main army; it is probable that
the principal
thing he had in mind was to reduce the Confederate
forts on the Mississippi,
and open that river to navigation. He
virtually did nothing until about the 1st of March, when he
dispatched the force
up the Tennessee under C. F. Smith, to break
up the railway junctions, then to return
by water to Danville-a
sort of steamboat raid.
This
led to the selection of Pittsburg as the camp of
Grant's
army. Merely as a temporary base from which to make
raids against neighboring railway points, this place was good
enough
so long as it was known that the enemy was not in force
within striking distance. Even then it ought to have been
protected
with field-works. Soon, however, several things
happened to change matters, and to shape General Halleck's plans.
It
became known that the Confederates had evacuated Columbus, and
moved its large garrison southward on the railway, and
that
Johnston was concentrating his scattered forces at Corinth; and,
on the 11th of March, Halleck was placed in
supreme command of
all the Union forces in this theatre. Then the plan of moving
against Johnston
at Corinth took form with Halleck, and he
ordered Buell to move to Savannah. Although he believed,
however, that Johnston
had already assembled from 50,000 to
80,000 troops in the neighborhood of Corinth, he did
not enjoin
Buell to march speedily; nor did he order Grant to quit his
exposed position at Pittsburg. He did, however, order him to
intrench.
Nor did the peril of their
camps at Pittsburg appeal to General
Grant, or to any
of his subordinate commanders. That they did
not fortify their position may be condoned; ''hiding behind
earthworks''
had not yet become the fashion. For a commander to
intrench his camp in the open, at this time, would perhaps have
been
regarded as showing timidity; yet the Confederates had
already set Grant and his generals the example at Donelson, and
taught them the defensive strength of field-works. The
Confederate generals at Corinth
were apparently just as careless
about the protection of their camps. But that Grant kept his
troops at Pittsburg
Landing at all and that his service of
''security and information'' was performed so inadequately, passes
one's understanding.
Even though neither side had, as yet,
learned how to use its cavalry in this kind of work, one cannot
understand how
Johnston's entire army could bivouac within two
miles of Sherman's headquarters without having its presence
discovered, or even suspected, by
that general.
The wisdom of President Lincoln's order placing a single general,
albeit the choice fell upon General
Halleck, in command of this
whole theater of operations, was amply verified in the campaign.
It brought Buell with
his army to the field of Shiloh
in time to
turn a Union defeat into victory; possibly in time to save
Grant's army from capture. After Shiloh it enabled Halleck
promptly to assemble there a splendid army of 100,000 troops,
nearly
every man of which had been tried by the fire of battle.
In leaving Pope, however, with his five divisions, some 25,000
men, to operate against New Madrid and Island No. 10, after he
had resolved to concentrate against the Confederates
at Corinth,
Halleck made a mistake. A small ''containing''
force might have
been left to watch the Confederates at those points; but Pope,
with his main body, ought to have
been hastened to a junction
with Grant and Buell. A commander should have only one main
objective at a time, and he
should direct all of his troops, all
of his operations, with reference to that single objective.
Johnston's
army assembling at Corinth was, or ought to have been,
Halleck's
single objective for the time. To overtake that army
and destroy it ought to have been Halleck's first single purpose.
''When you have resolved to fight a battle, collect your whole
force.'' Halleck had the three armies of Grant, Pope,
and Buell
within the theatre; he ought to have let go all other objectives
for the time, and concentrated those three
armies for battle with
Johnston. Every company left operating
against the Confederate
posts on the Mississippi which did not keep an equivalent force
of Confederates from joining Johnston's main body was
a company
wrongly employed. Pope's army ought to have taken part in the
battle of Shiloh.
Nor
would the Confederate detachments in those two forward and
isolated posts have had any chance of holding out after the
main
Confederate army had fallen back to Corinth. As the
little force
of 7,000 or 8,000 men, however, ''contained'' more than thrice
their number of the enemy, Pope's army,
the sacrifice would have
been amply justified if it had resulted in a Confederate victory
at Shiloh.
On
the 3rd of April, just before the movement or Shiloh, the main
body of Johnston's army
was at Corinth, with two bad roads to
march by; one division was at Burnsville,
a railway station
fifteen miles to the east; another division was at Bethel,
a
station twenty miles to the north. These columns were to
converge near Mickey's, a road-center about eight miles
from Pittsburg Landing. Owing to poor maps, bad roads,
and inexperience and inefficiency on the part of officers and
men, the concentration was made so slowly that the attack
planned for daylight of the 5th could not take place until
the
6th. This not only lessened the chances of taking the Union
army unawares but also enabled Buell to reach the
ground in time
to defeat the Confederates on the 7th. This incident
illustrates, alike, the importance of good maps;
the importance
of carefully reckoning with the elements of time, distance, the
condition of the roads, and the quality
of the troops, in
combining movements; and the obligation that rests upon
every subordinate commander, from the second
in command down
to the platoon-commanders, to carry out his part of the plan
in spite of all hindrances.
By
their defeat at Shiloh the Confederates were thrown back upon
Corinth, losing all hold upon Tennessee west of the mountains,
except two or three forts on the Mississippi, which were soon
wrested from them; the South experienced the severest
blow it had
as yet received; the way was opened for Halleck to assemble
100,000 troops, without any interference;
and the opportunity was
made for him, if he had possessed the will and the ability to
avail himself of it, to crush
the remnant of Beauregard's beaten
army within a few days, and to ''split secession in twain in one
month,'' as he
had promised to do.
So much for the strategy of the campaign. We have not enough
time and space within an hour's
lecture to devote to the tactics
of the engagement. Hours might easily be spent in pointing out
faults and mistakes;
but probably no other great battle of the
Civil War furnished fewer examples of good tactics for the
student to emulate
than the battle of Shiloh, especially the
first day's action.
The first and most
glaring fault to be noticed is that
neither hostile army on that day was commanded in fact. The two
armies fought
without head. To this circumstance all the
other errors and shortcomings may properly be charged. General
Grant was
not on the field at all until several hours after
the engagement began, and neither he nor General Johnston
established
headquarters from which to direct or control
his forces. Grant ''visited'' his several division commanders, and
gave
them some verbal orders; but the different positions were
taken up without any direction from him. Hurlbut and W. H. L.
Wallace had sent forward reinforcements from their respective
divisions, as they judged best, and had moved forward
to form
their line before General Grant arrived. General Johnston
went immediately into the thick of the battle, and
''was killed
doing the work of a brigadier.'' At one time General Johnston,
Commander-in-Chief; General Breckinridge,
Ex-Vice-President of
the United States; and Governor Harris of Tennessee were all
three found leading a single regiment forward.
I General Grant
and General Johnston, as army commanders, exerted very little
influence upon the character of the
tactics in this great battle.
Johnston and Beauregard had planned to make their ''main attack''
against the Union left, with a view to driving the army back upon
Snake Creek and Owl Creek. The onset, however,
developed into a
simple frontal attack all along the line. ''The front of attack,
which was at first less than 2,000
yards in length, in three
hours extended from the Tennessee River, on the east, to Owl
Creek, on the west, nearly
four miles. . . . The attack was
turning both flanks, and breaking the center, all at once,-a
procedure only to be
used by an overwhelming force. The
Federals, instead of being driven down the river, as the
intention was, were driven
to the landing, where their gunboats
and supplies were.''
The Union army, which should have been in a ''position
in readiness,'' ''was scattered about in isolated camps. . . .
There was no defensive line, no point of assembly,
no proper
outposts, no one to give orders in the absence of the regular
commander, whose headquarters were nine miles
away. The greenest
troops (the divisions of Prentiss and Sherman) were in the most
exposed positions. Sherman had three brigades on the right, and
one on the left, with an interval of several
miles between them.''
''The Confederate formation shows the mistake of using ex-
tended lines instead of deep formations
for attack. The
long lines, moving forward, spread out to right and left. Gaps
in the forward line were filled by
portions of the lines coming
up from the rear. Corps, divisions, and brigades were soon mixed
in hopeless confusion.
Attacks were made and lost before
supporting troops came up, and the action degenerated into
a series of isolated
combats, which were without a general
plan, and ineffective. No one knew from whom to take orders.
One regiment received
orders from three different corps-
commanders within a short time. As a result many aimless
and conflicting orders
were issued which unnecessarily
exhausted and discouraged the troops. The highest commanders,
including the adjutant-general,
went into the fight, and
devoted themselves to urging the troops forward, without any plan
or system. By 11 a.m. there
was not a reserve on the
field. Instead of feeding the fight with their own troops, the
corps-commanders finally sought
various parts of the field, and
took command without regard to the order of battle. Bragg may
be found at the center,
at the right, and then at the
left. . . . Beauregard remained near Shiloh, without a
reserve,
and unable to exercise any influence on the battle.''
On the Federal side the tactics were, if possible,
worse. With
no prearranged plan, there was want of cohesion and concert of
action between the various units. Regiments
were rarely overcome
in front, but each one fell back because the regiment on its
right or left had done so, and exposed
its flank. Then
it continued its backward movement, in turn exposing the flank
of its neighbor, which then must needs,
also, fall back. Once
in operation this process repeated itself indefinitely. The
reserves were not judiciously used
to counteract partial
reverses, and to preserve the front of battle.
The straggling, or rather skulking, on the
Confederate side, and
the fleeing to the rear on the Union side, were frightful among
the raw troops. On the Union
side crowds of terror stricken
fugitives, estimated all the way from 5,000 to 15,000, huddled
under the bluffs at
the riverside; at the close of the day Grant
had no more than 4,000 men in line. On the Confederate side it
was hardly
any better. ''The victorious troops had been
demoralized by reckless attacks, which were never supported, and
thousands
of them immediately gave up the battle to pillage the
camps.'' It is probable that ''the debris of the army surging back
upon'' Beauregard at Shiloh, two miles in rear, influenced him to
order the attack
to cease. He has been much blamed for that
order; but it is not at all likely that he could have carried the
last
position taken by his enemy that evening. Bragg had only
got together two brigades for the attack, and one of them had
no
ammunition. Furthermore, Nelson's Federal division was just
arriving, and night was at hand.
In his own
account of the engagement General Beauregard intimates
that he was aware that Buell's army was arriving. If such was
the
case, he made a mistake in remaining on the field that night.
There was no chance for his depleted army after Buell arrived;
he
ought to have withdrawn it as quickly, and with as little loss,
as possible. All of his stubborn resistance on
the second day
was a useless sacrifice of life. Nothing was to be gained by
continuing the battle against overwhelming
numbers of fresh
troops.
The character of the battle-field, in general thickly covered
with forest, was not
favorable for the employment of artillery or
cavalry. The artillery, however, in spite of the woods, played
an important
part in the battle. We find batteries giving
strong help at every point of attack and defense. Guns were lost
on both
sides; some were taken and retaken. The last stand of
the Federals, on Sunday evening, was made near a line of
guns
hastily collected. Those guns played a conspicuous part in
the last act of this day of battle. One battery only disgraced
itself, the 13th Ohio Battery. When the first Confederate shell
fell among them the men deserted their guns and fled
incontinently. ''The 13th was blotted out, and on Ohio's
roster its place remained a blank throughout the war.''
The Union cavalry does not appear to have done anything
during
the battle; on the side of the Confederates Forrest's horsemen
charged a battery, capturing some of its guns;
swept through the
shattered Union left, cutting off the troops of Prentiss; and, on
the second day, covered the withdrawal
of the beaten army,
forming the very last line of the rear-guard. On the 8th they
boldly charged Sherman's column and put an end to the Union
pursuit.
''The first day at Shiloh shows, better than any other in
our history,'' Major Swift thinks, ''the kind of work performed
by
a raw army before it has had experience and discipline.''
Speaking of the throng of scared fugitives back at the
landing, General Grant says: ''Most of these men afterwards
proved themselves as gallant as any of those who saved
the battle
from which they had deserted.'' That is to say that with training
and service they afterwards became good
soldiers.
Source: American Campaigns Vol. I, p. 182
Recommended
Reading:
Shiloh--In Hell before Night. Description: James McDonough
has written a good, readable and concise history of a battle that the author characterizes as one of the most important of
the Civil War, and writes an interesting history of this decisive 1862 confrontation in the West. He blends first person and
newspaper accounts to give the book a good balance between the general's view and the soldier's view of the battle. Continued
below…
Particularly
enlightening is his description of Confederate General Albert Sidney Johnston, the commander who was killed on the first day
of the battle. McDonough makes a pretty convincing argument that Johnston
fell far short of the image that many give him in contemporary and historical writings. He is usually portrayed as an experienced
and decisive commander of men. This book shows that Johnston was a man of modest war and command experience, and that he
rose to prominence shortly before the Civil War. His actions (or inaction) prior to the meeting at Shiloh -- offering to let
his subordinate Beauregard take command for example -- reveal a man who had difficulty managing the responsibility fostered
on him by his command. The author does a good job of presenting several other historical questions and problems like Johnston's
reputation vs. reality that really add a lot of interest to the pages.
Recommended Reading: Seeing the Elephant: RAW RECRUITS AT THE
BATTLE OF SHILOH. Description: One of
the bloodiest battles in the Civil War, the two-day engagement near Shiloh,
Tennessee, in April 1862 left more than 23,000 casualties. Fighting alongside
seasoned veterans were more than 160 newly recruited regiments and other soldiers who had yet to encounter serious action.
In the phrase of the time, these men came to Shiloh to "see the elephant". Continued below…
Drawing on the letters, diaries,
and other reminiscences of these raw recruits on both sides of the conflict, "Seeing the Elephant" gives a vivid and valuable
primary account of the terrible struggle. From the wide range of voices included in this volume emerges a nuanced picture
of the psychology and motivations of the novice soldiers and the ways in which their attitudes toward the war were affected
by their experiences at Shiloh.
Recommended Reading:
Shiloh and the Western Campaign of 1862. Review: The bloody and decisive
two-day battle of Shiloh (April 6-7, 1862) changed the entire course of the American Civil
War. The stunning Northern victory thrust Union commander Ulysses S. Grant into the national spotlight, claimed the life of
Confederate commander Albert S. Johnston, and forever buried the notion that the Civil War would be a short conflict. The
conflagration at Shiloh had its roots in the strong Union advance during the winter of 1861-1862 that resulted in the capture
of Forts Henry and Donelson in Tennessee. Continued below…
The offensive collapsed General
Albert S. Johnston advanced line in Kentucky and forced him to withdraw all the way to northern Mississippi.
Anxious to attack the enemy, Johnston began concentrating Southern forces at Corinth,
a major railroad center just below the Tennessee border.
His bold plan called for his Army of the Mississippi to march north and destroy General Grant's
Army of the Tennessee before it could link up with another
Union army on the way to join him. On the morning of April 6, Johnston boasted to his subordinates,
"Tonight we will water our horses in the Tennessee!" They
nearly did so. Johnston's sweeping attack hit the unsuspecting Federal camps at Pittsburg Landing
and routed the enemy from position after position as they fell back toward the Tennessee River.
Johnston's sudden death in the Peach Orchard, however, coupled
with stubborn Federal resistance, widespread confusion, and Grant's dogged determination to hold the field, saved the Union
army from destruction. The arrival of General Don C. Buell's reinforcements that night turned the tide of battle. The next
day, Grant seized the initiative and attacked the Confederates, driving them from the field. Shiloh
was one of the bloodiest battles of the entire war, with nearly 24,000 men killed, wounded, and missing. Edward Cunningham,
a young Ph.D. candidate studying under the legendary T. Harry Williams at Louisiana
State University, researched and wrote Shiloh and the Western Campaign of 1862 in 1966. Although it remained unpublished, many Shiloh
experts and park rangers consider it to be the best overall examination of the battle ever written. Indeed, Shiloh
historiography is just now catching up with Cunningham, who was decades ahead of modern scholarship. Western Civil War historians
Gary D. Joiner and Timothy B. Smith have resurrected Cunningham's beautifully written and deeply researched manuscript from
its undeserved obscurity. Fully edited and richly annotated with updated citations and observations, original maps, and a
complete order of battle and table of losses, Shiloh and the Western Campaign of 1862 will
be welcomed by everyone who enjoys battle history at its finest. Edward Cunningham, Ph.D., studied under T. Harry Williams
at Louisiana State
University. He was the author of The Port Hudson Campaign: 1862-1863
(LSU, 1963). Dr. Cunningham died in 1997. Gary D. Joiner, Ph.D. is the author of One Damn Blunder from Beginning to End: The
Red River Campaign of 1864, winner of the 2004 Albert Castel Award and the 2005 A. M. Pate, Jr., Award, and Through the Howling
Wilderness: The 1864 Red River Campaign and Union Failure in the West. He lives in Shreveport,
Louisiana. About the Author: Timothy B. Smith, Ph.D., is author of Champion Hill:
Decisive Battle for Vicksburg (winner of the 2004 Mississippi
Institute of Arts and Letters Non-fiction Award), The Untold Story of Shiloh: The Battle and the Battlefield, and This Great
Battlefield of Shiloh: History, Memory, and the Establishment of a Civil War National Military Park. A former ranger at Shiloh,
Tim teaches history at the University of Tennessee.
Recommended
Reading: Shiloh: A Novel, by Shelby Foote. Review: In the novel Shiloh, historian and Civil War expert Shelby
Foote delivers a spare, unflinching account of the battle of Shiloh,
which was fought over the course of two days in April 1862. By mirroring the troops' movements through the woods of Tennessee
with the activity of each soldier's mind, Foote offers the reader a broad perspective of the battle and a detailed view of
the issues behind it. Continued below…
The battle becomes tangible as
Foote interweaves the observations of Union and Confederate officers, simple foot soldiers, brave men, and cowards and describes the roar
of the muskets and the haze of the gun smoke. The author's vivid storytelling creates a rich chronicle of a pivotal battle
in American history.
Recommended Reading: Shiloh:
The Battle That Changed the Civil War (Simon & Schuster). From Publishers Weekly: The bloodbath at Shiloh, Tenn. (April 6-7, 1862), brought an end to any remaining
innocence in the Civil War. The combined 23,000 casualties that the two armies inflicted on each other in two days shocked
North and South alike. Ulysses S. Grant kept his head and managed, with reinforcements, to win a hard-fought victory. Continued
below…
Confederate
general Albert Sidney Johnston was wounded and bled to death, leaving P.G.T. Beauregard to disengage and retreat with a dispirited
gray-clad army. Daniel (Soldiering in the Army of Tennessee) has crafted a superbly researched volume that will appeal to
both the beginning Civil War reader as well as those already familiar with the course of fighting in the wooded terrain bordering
the Tennessee River.
His impressive research includes the judicious use of contemporary newspapers and extensive collections of unpublished letters
and diaries. He offers a lengthy discussion of the overall strategic situation that preceded the battle, a survey of the generals
and their armies and, within the notes, sharp analyses of the many controversies that Shiloh
has spawned, including assessments of previous scholarship on the battle. This first new book on Shiloh
in a generation concludes with a cogent chapter on the consequences of those two fatal days of conflict.
Recommended
Reading:
The Battle of Shiloh and the
Organizations Engaged (Hardcover). Description: How can an essential "cornerstone of Shiloh
historiography" remain unavailable to the general public for so long? That's what I kept thinking as I was reading this reprint
of the 1913 edition of David W. Reed's “The Battle of Shiloh and the Organizations Engaged.” Reed, a veteran of
the Battle of Shiloh and the first historian of the Shiloh National Military Park,
was tabbed to write the official history of the battle, and this book was the result. Reed wrote a short, concise history
of the fighting and included quite a bit of other valuable information in the pages that followed. The large and impressive
maps that accompanied the original text are here converted into digital format and included in a CD located within a flap
at the back of the book. Author and former Shiloh Park Ranger Timothy Smith is responsible for bringing this important reference
work back from obscurity. His introduction to the book also places it in the proper historical framework. Continued below…
Reed's history
of the campaign and battle covers only seventeen pages and is meant to be a brief history of the subject. The detail is revealed
in the rest of the book. And what detail there is! Reed's order of battle for Shiloh goes down to the regimental and battery level. He includes the names of the leaders
of each organization where known, including whether or not these men were killed, wounded, captured, or suffered some other
fate. In a touch not often seen in modern studies, the author also states the original regiment of brigade commanders. In
another nice piece of detail following the order of battle, staff officers for each brigade and higher organization are listed.
The book's main point and where it truly shines is in the section entitled "Detailed Movements of Organizations". Reed follows
each unit in their movements during the battle. Reading this section along with referring to the computerized maps gives one
a solid foundation for future study of Shiloh. Forty-five pages cover the brigades of all
three armies present at Shiloh.
Wargamers
and buffs will love the "Abstract of Field Returns". This section lists Present for Duty, engaged, and casualties for each
regiment and battery in an easy to read table format. Grant's entire Army of the Tennessee
has Present for Duty strengths. Buell's Army of the Ohio
is also counted well. The Confederate Army of the Mississippi
is counted less accurately, usually only going down to brigade level and many times relying only on engaged strengths. That
said, buy this book if you are looking for a good reference work for help with your order of battle.
In what I
believe is an unprecedented move in Civil War literature, the University
of Tennessee Press made the somewhat unusual decision to include Reed's
detailed maps of the campaign and battle in a CD which is included in a plastic sleeve inside the back cover of the book.
The cost of reproducing the large maps and including them as foldouts or in a pocket in the book must have been prohibitive,
necessitating this interesting use of a CD. The maps were simple to view and came in a PDF format. All you'll need is Adobe
Acrobat Reader, a free program, to view these. It will be interesting to see if other publishers follow suit. Maps are an
integral part of military history, and this solution is far better than deciding to include poor maps or no maps at all. The
Read Me file that came with the CD relays the following information:
-----
The maps
contained on this CD are scans of the original oversized maps printed in the 1913 edition of D. W. Reed's The Battle of Shiloh
and the Organizations Engaged. The original maps, which were in a very large format and folded out of the pages of this edition,
are of varying sizes, up to 23 inches by 25 inches. They were originally created in 1901 by the Shiloh National Military
Park under the direction of its historian, David W. Reed. They are the
most accurate Shiloh battle maps in existence.
The maps
on the CD are saved as PDF (Portable Document Format) files and can be read on any operating system (Windows, Macintosh, Linux)
by utilizing Adobe Acrobat Reader. Visit http://www.adobe.com to download Acrobat Reader if you do not have it installed on
your system.
Map 1. The
Field of Operations from Which the Armies Were Concentrated at Shiloh, March and April 1862
Map 2. The
Territory between Corinth, Miss., and Pittsburgh
Landing, Tenn., Showing Positions and Route of the Confederate Army in Its Advance to Shiloh, April 3, 4, 5, & 6, 1862
Map 3. Positions
on the First Day, April 6, 1862
Map 4. Positions
on the Second Day, April 7, 1862
Complete
captions appear on the maps.
-----
Timothy Smith
has done students of the Civil War an enormous favor by republishing this important early work on Shiloh.
Relied on for generations by Park Rangers and other serious students of the battle, The Battle of Shiloh and the Organizations
Engaged has been resurrected for a new generation of Civil War readers. This classic reference work is an essential book for
those interested in the Battle of Shiloh. Civil War buffs, wargamers, and those interested in tactical minutiae will also
find Reed's work to be a very good buy. Highly recommended.
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