The Battle Of Shiloh
by Ulysses S. Grant, General U. S. A.
Battles And Leaders Of The Civil War
Written By Leading Participants
Published in 1884-1887
The battle of Shiloh, or Pittsburg Landing, fought on Sunday and Monday, the
6th and 7th of April, 1862, has been perhaps less understood, or, to state the case more accurately, more persistently misunderstood,
than any other engagement between National and Confederate troops during the entire rebellion. Correct reports of the battle
have been published, notably by Sherman, Badeau, and, in a speech before a meeting of veterans, by General Prentiss; but all
of these appeared long subsequent to the close of the rebellion, and after public opinion had been most erroneously formed.
Events had occurred before the battle, and others subsequent to it, which
determined me to make no report to my then chief, General Halleck, further than was contained in a letter, written immediately
after the battle, informing him that an engagement had been fought, and announcing the result. The occurrences alluded to
are these: After the capture of Fort Donelson, with over fifteen thousand effective men and all their munitions of war, I
believed much more could be accomplished without further sacrifice of life.
Clarksville, a town between Donelson and Nashville, in the State of Tennessee,
and on the east bank of the Cumberland, was garrisoned by the enemy. Nashville was also garrisoned, and was probably the best-provisioned
depot at the time in the Confederacy. Albert Sidney Johnston occupied Bowling Green, Ky., with a large force. I believed,
and my information justified the belief, that these places would fall into our hands without a battle, if threatened promptly.
I determined not to miss this chance. But being only a district commander, and under the immediate orders of the department
commander, General Halleck, whose headquarters were at St. Louis, it was my duty to communicate to him all I proposed to do,
and to get his approval, it possible. I did so communicate, and, receiving no reply, acted upon my own judgment. The result
proved that my information was correct, and sustained my judgment. What, then, was my surprise, after so much had been accomplished
by the troops--under my immediate command between the time of leaving Cairo, early in February, and the 4th of March, to receive
from my chief a dispatch of the latter date, saying: "You will place Major General C. F. Smith in command of expedition, and
remain yourself at Fort Henry. Why do you not obey my orders to report strength and positions of your command?" I was left
virtually in arrest on board a steamer, without even a guard, for about a week, when I was released and ordered to resume
Again: Shortly after the battle of Shiloh had been fought, General Halleck
moved his headquarters to Pittsburg Landing, and assumed command of the troops in the field. Although next to him in rank,
and nominally in command of my old district and army, I was ignored as much as if I had been at the most distant point of
territory within my jurisdiction; and although I was in command of all the troops engaged at Shiloh, I was not permitted to
see one of the reports of General Buell or his subordinates in that battle, until they were published by the War Department,
long after the event. In consequence, I never myself made a full report of this engagement.
When I was restored to my command, on the 13th of March, I found it on the
Tennessee River, part at Savannah and part at Pittsburg Landing, nine miles above, and on the opposite or western bank. I
generally spent the day at Pittsburg, and returned by boat to Savannah in the evening. I was intending to remove my headquarters
to Pittsburg, where I had sent all the troops immediately upon my reassuming command, but Buell, with the Army of the Ohio,
had been ordered to reŽnforce me from Columbia, Tenn. He was expected daily, and would come in at Savannah. I remained, therefore,
a few days longer than I otherwise should have done, for the purpose of meeting him on his arrival.
General Lew Wallace, with a division, had been placed by General Smith at
Crump's Landing, about five miles farther down the river than Pittsburg, and also on the west bank. His position I regarded
as so well chosen that be was not moved from it until the Confederate attack in force at Shiloh.
The skirmishing in our front had been so continuous from about the 3d of April
up to the determined attack, that I remained on the field each night until an hour when I felt there would be no further danger
before morning. In fact, on Friday, the 4th, I was very much injured by my horse falling with me and on me while I was trying
to get to the front, where firing had been heard. The night was one of impenetrable darkness, with rain pouring down in torrents;
nothing was visible to the eye except as revealed by the frequent flashes of lightning. Under these circumstances I had to
trust to the horse, without guidance, to keep the road. I had not gone far, however, when I met General W. H. L. Wallace and
General (then Colonel) McPherson coming from the direction of the front. They said all was quiet so far as the enemy was concerned.
On the way back to the boat my horse's feet slipped from under him, and he fell with my leg under his body. The extreme softness
of the ground, from the excessive rains of the few preceding days, no doubt saved me from a severe injury and protracted lameness.
As it was, my ankle was very much injured; so much so, that my boot had to be cut off. During the battle, and for two or three
days after, I was unable to walk except with crutches.
On the 5th General Nelson, with a division of Buell's army, arrived at Savannah,
and I ordered him to move up the east bank of the river, to be in a position where he could be ferried over to Crump's Landing
or Pittsburg Landing, as occasion required. I had learned that General Buell himself would be at Savannah the next day, and
desired to meet me on his arrival. Affairs at Pittsburg Landing had been such for several days that I did not want to be away
during the day. I determined, therefore, to take a very early breakfast and ride out to meet Buell, and thus save time. He
had arrived on the evening of the 5th, but had not advised me of the fact, and I was not aware of it until some time after.
While I was at breakfast, however, heavy firing was heard in the direction of Pittsburg Landing, and I hastened there, sending
a hurried note to Buell, informing him of the reason why I could not meet him at Savannah. On the way up the river I directed
the dispatch-boat to run in close to Crump's Landing, so that I could communicate with General Lew Wallace. I found him waiting
on a boat, apparently expecting to see me, and I directed him to get his troops in line ready to execute any orders he might
receive. He replied that his troops were already under arms and prepared to move.
Up to that time I had felt by no means certain that Crump's Landing might
not be the point of attack. On reaching the front, however, about 8 A. M., I found that the attack on Shiloh was unmistakable,
and that nothing more than a small guard, to protect our transports and stores, was needed at Crump's. Captain A. S. Baxter,
a quartermaster on my staff, was accordingly directed to go back and order General Wallace to march immediately to Pittsburg,
by the road nearest the river. Captain Baxter made a memorandum of his order. About 1 P. M., not hearing from Wallace, and
being much in need of reŽnforeements, I sent two more of my staff, Colonel James B. McPherson and Captain W. R. Rowley, to
bring him up with his division. They reported finding him marching toward Purdy, Bethel, or some point west from the river,
and farther from Pittsburg by several miles than when he started. The road from his first position was direct, and near the
river. Between the two points a bridge had been built across Snake Creek by our troops, at which Wallace's command had assisted,
expressly to enable the troops at the two places to support each other in case of need. Wallace did not arrive in time to
take paxt in the first day's fight. General Wallace has since claimed that the order delivered to him by Captain Baxter was
simply to join the right of the army, and that the road over which he marched would have taken him to the road from Pittsburg
to Purdy, where it crosses Owl Creek, on the right of Sherman; but this is not where I had ordered him nor where I wanted
him to go. I never could see, and do not now see, why any order was necessary further than to direct him to come to Pittsburg
Landing, without specifying by what route. His was one of three veteran divisions that had been in battle, and its absence
was severely felt. Later in the war, General Wallace would never have made the mistake that he committed on the 6th of April,
1862. I presume his idea was that by taking the route he did, he would be able to come around on the flank or rear of the
enemy, and thus perform an act of heroism that would redound to the credit of his command, as well as to the benefit of his
Shiloh was a log meeting-house, some two or three miles from Pittsburg Landing,
and on the ridge which divides the waters of Snake and Lick creeks, the former entering into the Tennessee just north of Pittsburg
Landing, and the latter south. Shiloh was the key to our position, and was held by Sherman. His division was at that time
wholly raw, no part of it ever having been in an engagement, but I thought this deficiency was more than made up by the superiority
of the commander. McClernand was on Sherman's left, with troops that had been engaged at Fort Donelson, and were therefore
veterans so far as Western troops had become such at that stage of the war. Next to McClernand came Prentiss, with a raw division,
and on the extreme left, Stuart, with one brigade of Sherman's division. Hurlbut was in rear of Prentiss, massed, and in reserve
at the time of the onset. The division of General C. F. Smith was on the right, also in reserve. General Smith was sick in
bed at Savannah, some nine miles below, but in hearing of our guns. His services on those two eventful days would no doubt
have been of inestimable value had his health permitted his presence. The command of his division devolved upon Brigadier-General
W. H. L. Wallace, a most estimable and able officer, --a veteran, too, for he had served a year in the Mexican war, and had
been with his command at Henry and Donelson. Wallace was mortally wounded in the first day's engagement, and with the change
of commanders thus necessarily effected in the heat of battle, the efficiency of his division was much weakened.
The position of our troops made a continuous line from Lick Creek, on the
left, to Owl Creek, a branch of Snake Creek, on the right, facing nearly south, and possibly a little west. The water in all
these streams was very high at the time, and contributed to protect our flanks. The enemy was compelled, therefore, to attack
directly in front. This he did with great vigor, inflicting heavy losses on the National side, but suffering much heavier
on his own.
The Confederate assaults were made with such disregard of losses on their
own side, that our line of tents soon fell into their hands. The ground on which the battle was fought was undulating, heavily
timbered, with scattered clearings, the woods giving some protection to the troops on both sides. There was also considerable
underbrush. A number of attempts were made by the enemy to turn our right flank, where Sherman was posted, but every effort
was repulsed with heavy loss. But the front attack was kept up so vigorously that, to prevent the success of these attempts
to get on our flanks, the National troops were compelled several times to take positions to the rear, nearer Pittsburg Landing.
When the firing ceased at night, the National line was all of a mile in rear of the position it had occupied in the morning.
In one of the backward moves, on the 6th, the division commanded by General
Prentiss did not fall back with the others. This left his flanks-exposed, and enabled the enemy to capture him, with about
2200 of his officers and men. General Badeau gives 4 o'clock of the 6th as about the time this capture took place. He may
be right as to the time, but my recollection is that the hour was later. General Prentiss himself gave the hour as half-past
five. I was with him, as I was with each of the division commanders that day, several times, and my recollection is that the
last time I was with him was about half-past four, when his division was standing up firmly, and the general was as cool as
if expecting victory. But no matter whether it was four or later, the story that he and his command were surprised and captured
in their camps is without any foundation whatever. If it had been true, as currently reported at the time, and yet believed
by thousands of people, that Prentiss and his division had been captured in their beds, there would not have been an all-day
struggle with the loss of thousands killed and wounded on the Confederate side.
With the single exception of a few minutes after the capture of Prentiss,
a continuous and unbroken line was maintained all day from Snake Creek or its tributaries on the right to Lick Creek or the
Tennessee on the left, above Pittsburg. There was no hour during the day when there was not heavy firing and generally hard
fighting at some point on the line, but seldom at all points at the same time. It was a case of Southern dash against Northern
pluck and endurance.
Three of the five divisions engaged on Sunday were entirely raw, and many
of the men had only received their arms on the way from their States to the field. Many of them had arrived but a day or two
before, and were hardly able to load their muskets according to the manual. Their officers were equally ignorant of their
duties. Under these circumstances, it is not astonishing that many of the regiments broke at the first fire. In two cases,
as I now remember, colonels led their regiments from the field on first hearing the whistle of the enemy's bullets. In these
cases the colonels were constitutional cowards, unfit for any military position. But not so the officers and men led out of
danger by them. Better troops never went upon a battlefield than many of these officers and men afterward proved themselves
to be who fled panic-stricken at the first whistle of bullets and shell at Shiloh.
During the whole of Sunday I was continuously engaged in passing from one
part of the field to another, giving directions to division commanders. In thus moving along the line, however, I never deemed
it important to stay long with Sherman. Although his troops were then under fire for the first time, their commander, by his
constant presence with them, inspired a confidence in officers and men that enabled them to render services on that bloody
battle-field worthy of the best of veterans. McClernand was next to Sherman, and the hardest fighting was in front of these
two divisions. McClernand told me on that day, the 6th, that he profited much by having so able a commander supporting him.
A casualty to Sherman that would have taken him from the field that day would have been a sad one for the troops engaged at
Shiloh. And how near we came to this! On the 6th Sherman was shot twice, once in the hand, once in the shoulder, the ball
cutting his coat and making a slight wound, and a third ball passed through his hat. In addition to this he had several horses
shot during the day.
The nature of this battle was such that cavalry could not be used in front;
I therefore formed ours into line, in rear, to stop stragglers, of whom there were many. When there would be enough of them
to make a show, and after they had recovered from their fright, they would be sent to reŽnforce some part of the line which
needed support, without regard to their companies, regiments, or brigades.
On one occasion during the day, I rode back as far as the river and met General
Buell, who had just arrived; I do not remember the hour, but at that time there probably were as many as four or five thousand
stragglers lying under cover of the river-bluff, panic-stricken, most of whom would have been shot where they lay, without
resistance, before they would have taken muskets and marched to the front to protect themselves. This meeting between General
Buell and myself was on the dispatch-boat used to run between the landing and Savannah. It was brief, and related specially
to his getting his troops over the river. As we left the boat together, Buell's attention was attracted by the men lying under
cover of the bank. I saw him berating them and trying to shame them into joining their regiments. He even threatened them
with shells from the gun-boats nearby. But it was all to no effect. Most of these men afterward proved themselves as gallant
as any of those who saved the battle from which they had deserted. I have no doubt that this sight impressed General Buell
with the idea that a line of retreat would be a good thing just then. If he had come in by the front instead of through the
stragglers in the rear, he would have thought and felt differently. Could he have come through the Confederate rear, he would
have witnessed there a scene similar to that at our own. The distant rear of an army engaged in battle is not the best place
from which to judge correctly what is going on in front. Later in the war, while occupying the country between the Tennessee
and the Mississippi, I learned that the panic in the Confederate lines had not differed much from that within our own. Some
of the country people estimated the stragglers from Johnston's army as high as twenty thousand. Of course, this was an exaggeration.
The situation at the close of Sunday was as follows: Along the top of the
bluff just south of the log-house which stood at Pittsburg Landing, Colonel J. D. Webster, of my staff, had arranged twenty
or more pieces of artillery facing south, or up the river. This line of artillery was on the crest of a hill overlooking a
deep ravine opening into the Tennessee. Hurlbut, with his division intact, was on the right of this artillery, extending west
and possibly a little north. McClernand came next in the general line, looking more to the west. His division was complete
in its organization and ready for any duty. Sherman came next, his right extending to Snake Creek. His command, like the other
two, was complete in its organization and ready, like its chief, for any service it might be called upon to render. All three
divisions were, as a matter of course, more or less shattered and depleted in numbers from the terrible battle of the day.
The division of W. H. L. Wallace, as much from the disorder arising from changes of division and brigade commanders, under
heavy fire, as from any other cause, had lost its organization, and did not occupy a place in the line as a division; Prentiss's
command was gone as a division, many of its members having been killed, wounded, or captured. But it had rendered valiant
service before its final dispersal, and had contributed a good share to the defense of Shiloh.
There was, I have said, a deep ravine in front of our left. The Tennessee
River was very high, and there was water to a considerable depth in the ravine. Here the enemy made a last desperate effort
to turn our flank, but was repelled. The gun-boats Tyler and Lexington, Gwin and Shirk commanding, with the
artillery under Webster, aided the army and effectually checked their further progress. Before any of Buell's troops had reached
the west bank of the Tennessee, firing had almost entirely ceased; anything like an attempt on the part of the enemy to advance
had absolutely ceased. There was some artillery firing from an unseen enemy, some of his shells passing beyond us; but I do
not remember that there was the whistle of a single musket-ball heard. As his troops arrived in the dusk, General Buell marched
several of his regiments part way down the face of the hill, where they fired briskly for some minutes, but I do not think
a single man engaged in this firing received an injury; the attack had spent its force.
General Lew Wallace, with 5000 effective men, arrived after firing had ceased
for the day, and was placed on the right. Thus night came, Wallace came, and the advance of Nelson's division came, but none--unless
night--in time to be of material service to the gallant men who saved Shiloh on that first day, against large odds. Buell's
loss on the 6th of April was two men killed and one wounded, all members of the 36th Indiana Infantry. The Army of the Tennessee
lost on that day at least 7000 men. The presence of two or three regiments of his army on the west bank before firing ceased
had not the slightest effect in preventing the capture of Pittsburg Landing.
So confident was I before firing had ceased on the 6th that the next day would
bring victory to our arms if we could only take the initiative, that I visited each division commander in person before any
reŽnforeements had reached the field. I directed them to throw out heavy lines of skirmishers in the morning as soon as they
could see, and push them forward until they found the enemy, following with their entire divisions in supporting distance,
and to engage the enemy as soon as found. To Sherman I told the story of the assault at Fort Donelson, and said that the same
tactics would win at Shiloh. Victory was assured when Wallace arrived even if there had been no other support. The enemy received
no reŽnforeements. He had suffered heavy losses in killed, wounded, and straggling, and his commander, General Albert Sidney
Johnston, was dead. I was glad, however, to see the reŽnforeements of Buell and credit them with doing all there was for them
to do. During the night of the 6th the remainder of Nelson's division, Buell's army, crossed the river, and were ready to
advance in the morning, forming the left wing. Two other divisions, Crittenden's and McCook's, came up the river from Savannah
in the transports, and were on the west bank early on the 7th. Buell commanded them in person. My command was thus nearly
doubled in numbers and efficiency.
During the night rain fell in torrents, and our troops were exposed to the
storm without shelter. I made my headquarters under a tree a few hundred yards back from the river-bank. My ankle was so much
swollen from the fall of my horse the Friday night preceding, and the bruise was so painful, that I could get no rest. The
drenching rain would have precluded the possibility of sleep, without this additional cause. Some time after midnight, growing
restive under the storm and the continuous pain, I moved back to the log-house on the bank. This had been taken as a hospital,
and all night wounded men were being brought in, their wounds dressed, a leg or an arm amputated, as the case might require,
and everything being done to save life or alleviate suffering. The sight was more unendurable than encountering the enemy's
fire, and I returned to my tree in the rain.
The advance on the morning of the 7th developed the enemy in the camps occupied
by our troops before the battle began, more than a mile back from the most advanced position of the Confederates on the day
before. It is known now that they had not yet learned of the arrival of Buell's command. Possibly they fell back so far to
get the shelter of our tents during the rain, and also to get away from the shells that were dropped upon them by the gun-boats
every fifteen minutes during the night.
The position of the Union troops on the morning of the 7th was as follows:
General Lew Wallace on the right, Sherman on his left; then McClernand, and then Hurlbut. Nelson, of Buell's army, was on
our extreme left, next to the river; Crittenden was next in line after Nelson, and on his right; McCook followed, and formed
the extreme right of Buell's command. My old command thus formed the right wing, while the troops directly under Buell constituted
the left wing of the army. These relative positions were retained during the entire day, or until the enemy was driven from
In a very short time the battle became general all along the line. This day
everything was favorable to the Federal side. We had now become the attacking party. The enemy was driven back all day, as
we had been the day before, until finally he beat a precipitate retreat. The last point held by him was near the road leading
from the landing to Corinth, on the left of Sherman and right of McClernand. About 3 o'clock, being near that point and seeing
that the enemy was giving way everywhere else, I gathered up a couple of regiments, or parts of regiments, from troops near
by, formed them in line of battle and marched them forward, going in front myself to prevent premature or long-range firing.
At this point there was a clearing between us and the enemy favorable for charging, although exposed. I knew the enemy were
ready to break, and only wanted a little encouragement from us to go quickly and join their friends who had started earlier.
After marching to within musket-range, I stopped and let the troops pass. The command, Charge, was given, and was executed
with loud cheers, and with a run, when the last of the enemy broke.
During this second day of the battle I had been moving from right to left
and back, to see for myself the progress made. In the early part of the afternoon, while riding with Colonel James B. McPherson
and Major J. P. Hawkins, then my chief commissary, we got beyond the left of our troops. We were moving along the northern
edge of a clearing, very leisurely, toward the river above the landing. There did not appear to be an enemy to our right,
until suddenly a battery with musketry opened upon us from the edge of the woods on the other side of the clearing. The shells
and balls whistled about our ears very fast for about a minute. I do not think it took us longer than that to get out of range
and out of sight. In the sudden start we made, Major Hawkins lost his hat. He did not stop to pick it up. When we arrived
at a perfectly safe position we halted to take an account of damages. McPherson's horse was panting as if ready to drop. On
examination it was found that a ball had struck him forward of the flank just back of the saddle, and had gone entirely through.
In a few minutes the poor beast dropped dead; he had given no sign of injury until we came to a stop. A ball had struck the
metal scabbard of my sword, just below the belt, and broken it nearly off; before the battle was over, it had broken off entirely.
There were three of us: one had lost a horse, killed, one a hat, and one a sword-scabbard. All were thankful that it was no
After the rain of the night before and the frequent and heavy rains for some
days previous, the roads were almost impassable. The enemy, carrying his artillery and supply trains over them in his retreat,
made them still worse for troops following. I wanted to pursue, but had not the heart to order the men who had fought desperately
for two days, lying in the mud and rain whenever not fighting, and I did not feel disposed positively to order Buell, or any
part of his command, to pursue. Although the senior in rank at the time, I had been so only a few weeks. Buell was, and had
been for some time past, a department commander, while I commanded only a district. I did not meet Buell in person until too
late to get troops ready and pursue with effect; but, had I seen him at the moment of the last charge, I should have at least
requested him to follow.
The enemy had hardly started in retreat from his last position, when, looking
back toward the river, I saw a division of troops coming up in beautiful order, as if going on parade or review. The commander
was at the head of the column, and the staff seemed to be disposed about as they would have been had they been going; on parade.
When the head of the column came near where I was standing, it was halted, and the commanding officer, General A. McD. McCook,
rode up to where I was and appealed to me not to send his division any farther, saying that they were worn out with marching
and fighting. This division had marched on the 6th from a point ten or twelve miles east of Savannah, over bad roads. The
men had also lost rest during the night while crossing the Tennessee, and had been engaged in the battle of the 7th. It was
not, however, the rank and file or the junior officers who asked to be excused, but the division cornmander. I rode forward several miles the day after the battle, and found that the enemy had
dropped much, if not all, of their provisions, some ammunition, and the extra wheels of their caissons, lightening their loads
to enable them to get off their guns. About five miles out we found their field-hospital abandoned. An immediate pursuit must
have resulted in the capture of a considerable number of prisoners and probably some guns.
Shiloh was the severest battle fought at the West during the war, and but
few in the East equaled it for hard, determined fighting. I saw an open field, in our possession on the second day, over which
the Confederates had made repeated charges the day before, so covered with dead that it would have been possible to walk across
the clearing, in any direction, stepping on dead bodies, without a foot touching the ground. On our side National and Confederate
were mingled together in about equal proportions; but on the remainder of the field nearly all were Confederates. On one part,
which had evidently not been plowed for several years, probably because the land was poor, bushes had grown up, some to the
height of eight or ten feet. There was not one of these left standing unpierced by bullets. The smaller ones were all cut
Contrary to all my experience up to that time, and to the experience of the
army I was then commanding, we were on the defensive. We were without intrenchments or defensive advantages of any sort, and
more than half the army engaged the first day was without experience or even drill as soldiers. The officers with them, except
the division commanders, and possibly two or three of the brigade commanders, were equally inexperienced in war. The result
was a Union victory that gave the men who achieved it great confidence in themselves ever after.
The enemy fought bravely, but they had started out to defeat and destroy an
army and capture a position. They failed in both, with very heavy loss in killed and wounded, and must have gone back discouraged
and convinced that the "Yankee" was not an enemy to be despised.
After the battle I gave verbal instructions to division commanders to let
the regiments send out parties to bury their own dead, and to detail parties, under commissioned officers from each division,
to bury the Confederate dead in their respective fronts, and to report the numbers so buried. The latter part of these instructions
was not carried out by all; but they were by those sent from Sherman's division, and by some of the parties sent out by McClernand.
The heaviest loss sustained by the enemy was in front of these two divisions.
The criticism has often been made that the Union troops should have been intrenched
at Shiloh; but up to that time the pick and spade had been but little resorted to at the West. I had, however, taken this
subject under consideration soon after reassuming command in the field. McPherson, my only military engineer, had been directed
to lay out a line to intrench. He did so, but reported that it would have to be made in rear of the line of encampment as
it then ran. The new line, while it would be nearer the river, was yet too far away from the Tennessee, or even from the creeks,
to be easily supplied with water from them; and in case of attack, these creeks would be in the hands of the enemy. Besides
this, the troops with me, officers and men, needed discipline and drill more than they did experience with the pick, shovel,
and axe. ReŽnforcements were arriving almost daily, composed of troops that had been hastily thrown together into companies
and regiments--fragments of incomplete organizations, the men and officers strangers to each other. Under all these circumstances
I concluded that drill and discipline were worth more to our men than fortifications.
General Buell was a brave, intelligent officer, with as much professional
pride and ambition of a commendable sort as I ever knew. I had been two years at West Point with him, and had served with
him afterward, in garrison and in the Mexican war, several years more. He was not given in early life or in mature years to
forming intimate acquaintances. He was studious by habit, and commanded the confidence and respect of all who knew him. Ile
was a strict disciplinarian, and perhaps did not distinguish sufficiently between the volunteer who "enlisted for the war"
and the soldier who serves in time of peace. One system embraced men who risked life for a principle, and often men of social
standing, competence, or wealth, and independence of character. The other includes, as a rule, only men who could not do as
well in any other occupation. General Buell became an object of harsh criticism later, some going so far as to challenge his
loyalty. No one who knew him ever believed him capable of a dishonorable act, and nothing could be more dishonorable than
to accept high rank and command in war and then betray the trust. When I came into command of the army, in 1864, I requested
the Secretary of War to restore General Buell to duty.
After the war, during the summer of 1865, I traveled considerably through
the North, and was everywhere met by large numbers of people. Every one had his opinion about the manner in which the war
had been conducted; who among the generals had failed, how, and why. Correspondents of the press were ever on hand to hear
every word dropped, and were not always disposed to report correctly what did--not confirm their preconceived notions, either
about the conduct of the war or the individuals concerned in it. The opportunity frequently occurred for me to defend General
Buell against what I believed to be most unjust charges. On one occasion a correspondent put in my mouth the very charge I
had so often refuted--of disloyalty. This brought from General Buell a very severe retort, which I saw in the New York "World"
some time before I received the letter itself. I could very well understand his grievance at seeing untrue and disgraceful
charges apparently sustained by an officer who, at the time, was at the head of the army. I replied to him, but not through
the press. I kept no copy of my letter, nor did I ever see it in print, neither did I receive an answer.
General Albert Sidney Johnston, who commanded the Confederate forces at the
beginning of the battle, was disabled by a wound in the afternoon of the first day. His wound, as I understood afterward,
was not necessarily fatal, or even dangerous. But he was a man who would not abandon what he deemed an important trust in
the face of danger, and consequently continued in the saddle, commanding, until so exhausted by the loss of blood that he
had to be taken from his horse, and soon after died. The news was not long in reaching our side, and, I suppose, was quite
an encouragement to the National soldiers. I had known Johnston slightly in the Mexican war, and later as an officer in the
regular army. He was a man of high character and ability. His contemporaries at West Point, and officers generally who came
to know him personally later, and who remained on our side, expected him to prove the most formidable man to meet that the
Confederacy would produce. Nothing occurred in his brief command of an army to prove or disprove the high estimate that had
been placed upon his military ability.
General Beauregard was next in rank to Johnston, and succeeded to the command,
which he retained to the close of the battle and during the subsequent retreat on Corinth, as well as in the siege of that
place. His tactics have been severely criticised by Confederate writers, but I do not believe his fallen chief could have
done any better under the circumstances. Some of these critics claim that Shiloh was won when Johnston fell, and that if he
had not fallen the army under me would have been annihilated or captured. Ifs defeated the Confederates at Shiloh.
There is little doubt that we would have been disgracefully beaten if all the shells and bullets fired by us had passed
harmlessly over the enemy, and if all of theirs had taken effect. Commanding generals are liable to be killed during
engagements; and the fact that when he was shot Johnston was leading a brigade to induce it to make a charge which had been
repeatedly ordered, is evidence that there was neither the universal demoralization on our side nor the unbounded confidence
on theirs which has been claimed. There was, in fact, no hour during the day when I doubted the eventual defeat of the enemy,
although I was disappointed that reŽnforeements so near at hand did not arrive at an earlier hour.
The Confederates fought with courage at Shiloh, but the particular skill claimed
I could not, and still cannot, see; though there is nothing to criticise except the claims put forward for it since. But the
Confederate claimants for superiority in strategy, superiority in generalship, and superiority in dash and prowess are not
so unjust to the Union troops engaged at Shiloh as are many Northern writers. The troops on both sides were American, and
united they need not fear any foreign foe. It is possible that the Southern man started in with a little more dash than his
Northern brother; but he was correspondingly less enduring.
The endeavor of the enemy on the first day was simply to hurl their men against
ours--first at one point, then at another, sometimes at several points at once. This they did with daring and energy, until
at night the rebel troops were worn out. Our effort during the same time was to be prepared to resist assaults wherever made.
The object of the Confederates on the second day was to get away with as much of their army and material as possible. Ours
then was to drive them from our front, and to capture or destroy as great a part as possible of their men and material. We
were successful in driving them back, but not so successful in captures as if further pursuit could have been made. As it
was, we captured or recaptured on the second day about as much artillery as we lost on the first; and, leaving out the one
great capture of Prentiss, we took more prisoners on Monday than the enemy gained from us on Sunday. On the 6th Sherman lost
7 pieces of artillery, McClernand 6, Prentiss 8, and Hurlbut 2 batteries. On the 7th Sherman captured 7 guns, McClernand 3,
and the Army of the Ohio 20.
At Shiloh the effective strength of the Union force on the morning of the
6th was 33,000. Lew Wallace brought five thousand more after nightfall. Beauregard reported the enemy's strength at 40,955.
According to the custom of enumeration in the South, this number probably excluded every man enlisted as musician, or detailed
as guard or nurse, and all commissioned officers, --everybody who did not carry a musket or serve a cannon. With us everybody
in the field receiving pay from the Government is counted. Excluding the troops who fled, panic-stricken, before they had
fired a shot, there was not a time during the 6th when we had more then 25,000 men in line. On the 7th Buell brought twenty
thousand more. Of his remaining two divisions, Thomas's did not reach the field during the engagement; Wood's arrived before
firing had ceased, but not in time to be of much service.
Our loss in the two-days fight was 1751 killed, 8408 wounded, and 2885 missing.
Of these 2103 were in the Army of the Ohio. Beauregard reported a total loss of 10,699, of whom 1728 were killed, 8012 wounded,
and 959 missing. This estimate must be incorrect. We buried, by actual count, more of the enemy's dead in front of the divisions
of McClernand and Sherman alone than here reported, and four thousand was the estimate of the burial parties for the whole
field. Beauregard reports the Confederate force on the 6th at over 40,000, and their total loss during the two days at 10,699;
and at the same time declares that he could put only 20,000 men in battle on the morning of the 7th.
The navy gave a hearty support to the army at Shiloh, as indeed it always
did, both before and subsequently, when I was in command. The nature of the ground was such, however, that on this occasion
it could do nothing in aid of the troops until sundown on the first day. The country was broken and heavily timbered, cutting
off all view of the battle from the river, so that friends would be as much in danger from fire from the gun-boats as the
foe. But about sundown, when the National troops were back in their last position, the right of the enemy was near the river
and exposed to the fire of the two gun-boats, which was delivered with vigor and effect. After nightfall, when firing had
entirely ceased on land, the commander of the fleet informed himself, proximately, of the position of our troops, and suggested
the idea of dropping a shell within the lines of the enemy every fifteen minutes during the night. This was done with effect,
as is proved by the Confederate reports.
Up to the battle of Shiloh, I, as well as thousands of other citizens, believed
that the rebellion against the Government would collapse suddenly and soon if a decisive victory could be gained over any
of its armies. Henry and Donelson were such victories. An army of more than 21,000 men was captured or destroyed. Bowling
Green, Columbus, and Hickman, Ky., fell in consequence, and Clarksville and Nashville, Tenn., the last two with an immense
amount of stores, also fell into our bands. The Tennessee and Cumberland rivers, from their mouths to the head of navigation,
were secured. But when Confederate armies were collected which not only attempted to hold a line farther south, from Memphis
to Chattanooga, Knoxville and on to the Atlantic, but assumed the offensive, and made such a gallant effort to regain what
had been lost, then, indeed, I gave up all idea of saving the Union except by complete conquest. Up to that time it had been
the policy of our army, certainly of that portion commanded by me, to protect the property of the citizens whose territory
was invaded, without regard to their sentiments, whether Union or Secession. After this, however, I regarded it as humane
to both sides to protect the persons of those found at their homes but to consume everything that could be used to support
or supply armies. Protection was still continued over such supplies as were within lines held by us, and which we expected
to continue to hold. But such supplies within the reach of Confederate armies I regarded as contraband as much as arms or
ordnance stores. Their destruction was accomplished without bloodshed, and tended to the same result as the destruction of
armies. I continued this policy to the close of the war. Promiscuous pillaging, however, was discouraged and punished. Instructions
were always given to take provisions and forage under the direction of commissioned officers, who should give receipts to
owners, if at home, and turn the property over to officers of the quartermaster or commissary departments, to be issued as
if furnished from our Northern depots. But much was destroyed without receipts to owners when it could not be brought within
our lines, and would otherwise have gone to the support of secession and rebellion. This policy, I believe, exercised a material
influence in hastening the end.
1. Since the publication in
"The Century" of my article on "The Battle of Shiloh" I have received from Mrs. W. H. L. Wallace, widow of the gallant general
who was killed in the first day's fight at that battle, a letter from General Lew Wallace to him, dated the morning of the
5th. At the date of this letter it was well known that the Confederates had troops out along the Mobile and Ohio railroad
west of Crump's Landing and Pittsburg Landing, and were also collecting near Shiloh. This letter shows that at that time General
Lew Wallace was making preparations for the emergency that might happen for the passing of re6nforcements between Shiloh and
his position, extending from Crump's Landing westward; and he sends the letter over the road running from Adamsville to the
Pittsburg Landing and Purdy road. These two roads intersect nearly a mile west of the crossing of the latter over Owl Creek,
where our right rested. In this letter General Lew Wallace advises General W. H. L. Wallace that he will send "to-morrow"
(and his letter also says "April 5th," which is the same day the letter was dated and which, therefore, must have been written
on the 4th) some cavalry to report to him at his headquarters, and suggesting the propriety of General W. H. L. Wallace's
sending a company back with them for the purpose of having the cavalry at the two landings familiarize themselves with the
road, so that they could "act promptly in case of emergency as guides to and from the different camps."
This modifies very materially what I have said, and what has been said by
others, of the conduct of General Lew Wallace at the battle of Shiloh. It shows that he naturally, with no more experience
than he had at the time in the profession of arms, would take the particular road that he did start upon in the absence of
orders to move by a different road.
The mistake he made, and which probably caused his apparent dilatoriness,
was that of advancing some distance after he found that the firing, which would be at first directly to his front and then
off to the left, had fallen back until it had got very much in rear of the position of his advance. This falling back had
taken place before I sent General Wallace orders to move up to Pittsburg Landing, and, naturally, my order was to follow the
road nearest the river. But my order was verbal, and to a staff-officer who was to deliver it to General Wallace, so that
I am not competent to say just what order the general actually received.
General Wallace's division was stationed, the First Brigade at Crump's Landing,
the Second out two miles, and the Third two and a half miles out. Hearing the sounds of battle, General Wallace early ordered
his First and Third brigades to concentrate on the Second. If the position of our front had not changed, the road which Wallace
took would have been somewhat shorter to our right than the River road.
U. S. GRANT.
MOUNT MCGREGOR, N. Y., June 21, 1865.
2. In an article on the battle
of Shiloh, which I wrote for "The Century" magazine, I stated that General A. McD. McCook, who commanded a division
of Buell's army, expressed some unwillingness to pursue the enemy on Monday, April 7th, because of the condition of his troops.
General Badeau, in his history, also makes the same statement, on my authority. Out of justice to General McCook and his command,
I must say that they left a point twenty-two miles east of Savannah on the morning of the 6th. From the heavy rains of a few
days previous and the passage of trains and artillery, the roads were necessarily deep in mud, which made marching slow. The
division had not only marched through this mud the day before, but it had been in the rain all night without rest. It was
engaged in the battle of the second day, and did as good service as its position allowed. In fact, an opportunity occurred
for it to perform a conspicuous act of gallantry which elicited the highest commendation from division commanders in the Army
of the Tennessee. General Sherman, both in his memoirs and report, makes mention of this fact. General McCook himself belongs
to a family which furnished many volunteers to the army. I refer to these circumstances with minuteness because I did General
McCook injustice in my article in "The Century," though not to the extent one would suppose from the public press. I am not
willing to do any one an injustice, and if convinced that I have done one, I am always willing to make the fullest admission.
U. S. GRANT.
MOUNT MCGREGOR, N.Y., June 21,1885.
3. In his "Personal Memoirs" General Grant says: "I once wrote that 'nothing
occurred in his brief command of an army to prove or disprove the high estimate that had been placed upon his military ability';
but after studying the orders and dispatches of Johnston I am compelled to materially modify my views of that officer's qualifications
as a soldier. My judgment now is that he was vacillating and undecided in his actions."
Reading: Shiloh and the Western Campaign
of 1862. Review: The bloody and decisive two-day
battle of Shiloh (April 6-7, 1862) changed the entire course of the American Civil War. The
stunning Northern victory thrust Union commander Ulysses S. Grant into the national spotlight, claimed the life of Confederate
commander Albert S. Johnston, and forever buried the notion that the Civil War would be a short conflict. The conflagration
at Shiloh had its roots in the strong Union advance during the winter of 1861-1862 that resulted in the capture of Forts Henry
and Donelson in Tennessee. Continued below…
collapsed General Albert S. Johnston advanced line in Kentucky and forced him to withdraw all the way to northern Mississippi. Anxious to attack the enemy, Johnston began
concentrating Southern forces at Corinth, a major railroad center just below the Tennessee border. His bold plan called for his Army of the Mississippi to march north and destroy General Grant's Army of the Tennessee
before it could link up with another Union army on the way to join him. On the morning of April 6, Johnston
boasted to his subordinates, "Tonight we will water our horses in the Tennessee!"
They nearly did so. Johnston's sweeping attack hit the unsuspecting Federal camps at Pittsburg
Landing and routed the enemy from position after position as they fell back toward the Tennessee River.
Johnston's sudden death in the Peach Orchard, however, coupled
with stubborn Federal resistance, widespread confusion, and Grant's dogged determination to hold the field, saved the Union
army from destruction. The arrival of General Don C. Buell's reinforcements that night turned the tide of battle. The next
day, Grant seized the initiative and attacked the Confederates, driving them from the field. Shiloh
was one of the bloodiest battles of the entire war, with nearly 24,000 men killed, wounded, and missing. Edward Cunningham,
a young Ph.D. candidate studying under the legendary T. Harry Williams at Louisiana
State University, researched and wrote Shiloh and the Western Campaign of 1862 in 1966. Although it remained unpublished, many Shiloh
experts and park rangers consider it to be the best overall examination of the battle ever written. Indeed, Shiloh
historiography is just now catching up with Cunningham, who was decades ahead of modern scholarship. Western Civil War historians
Gary D. Joiner and Timothy B. Smith have resurrected Cunningham's beautifully written and deeply researched manuscript from
its undeserved obscurity. Fully edited and richly annotated with updated citations and observations, original maps, and a
complete order of battle and table of losses, Shiloh and the Western Campaign of 1862 will
be welcomed by everyone who enjoys battle history at its finest. Edward Cunningham, Ph.D., studied under T. Harry Williams
at Louisiana State
University. He was the author of The Port Hudson Campaign: 1862-1863
(LSU, 1963). Dr. Cunningham died in 1997. Gary D. Joiner, Ph.D. is the author of One Damn Blunder from Beginning to End: The
Red River Campaign of 1864, winner of the 2004 Albert Castel Award and the 2005 A. M. Pate, Jr., Award, and Through the Howling
Wilderness: The 1864 Red River Campaign and Union Failure in the West. He lives in Shreveport,
Louisiana. About the Author: Timothy B. Smith, Ph.D., is author of Champion Hill:
Decisive Battle for Vicksburg (winner of the 2004 Mississippi
Institute of Arts and Letters Non-fiction Award), The Untold Story of Shiloh: The Battle and the Battlefield, and This Great
Battlefield of Shiloh: History, Memory, and the Establishment of a Civil War National Military Park. A former ranger at Shiloh,
Tim teaches history at the University of Tennessee.
Recommended Reading: Shiloh--In Hell before Night. Description: James McDonough has written a good, readable and concise history of a
battle that the author characterizes as one of the most important of the Civil War, and writes an interesting history of this
decisive 1862 confrontation in the West. He blends first person and newspaper accounts to give the book a good balance between
the general's view and the soldier's view of the battle. Continued below…
enlightening is his description of Confederate General Albert Sidney Johnston, the commander who was killed on the first day
of the battle. McDonough makes a pretty convincing argument that Johnston fell far short of the image that many give him
in contemporary and historical writings. He is usually portrayed as an experienced and decisive commander of men. This book
shows that Johnston was a man of modest war and command experience,
and that he rose to prominence shortly before the Civil War. His actions (or inaction) prior to the meeting at Shiloh -- offering
to let his subordinate Beauregard take command for example -- reveal a man who had difficulty managing the responsibility
fostered on him by his command. The author does a good job of presenting several other historical questions and problems like
Johnston's reputation vs. reality that really add a lot of
interest to the pages.
Recommended Reading: Seeing the Elephant: RAW RECRUITS AT THE BATTLE
Description: One of the bloodiest battles in the Civil War, the two-day engagement near Shiloh,
Tennessee, in April 1862 left more than 23,000 casualties. Fighting alongside
seasoned veterans were more than 160 newly recruited regiments and other soldiers who had yet to encounter serious action.
In the phrase of the time, these men came to Shiloh to "see the elephant". Continued below…
the letters, diaries, and other reminiscences of these raw recruits on both sides of the conflict, "Seeing the Elephant" gives
a vivid and valuable primary account of the terrible struggle. From the wide range of voices included in this volume emerges
a nuanced picture of the psychology and motivations of the novice soldiers and the ways in which their attitudes toward the
war were affected by their experiences at Shiloh.
Recommended Reading: Shiloh: The Battle
That Changed the Civil War (Simon & Schuster). From Publishers Weekly: The
bloodbath at Shiloh, Tenn.
(April 6-7, 1862), brought an end to any remaining innocence in the Civil War. The combined 23,000 casualties that the two
armies inflicted on each other in two days shocked North and South alike. Ulysses S. Grant kept his head and managed, with
reinforcements, to win a hard-fought victory. Continued below…
general Albert Sidney Johnston was wounded and bled to death, leaving P.G.T. Beauregard to disengage and retreat with a dispirited
gray-clad army. Daniel (Soldiering in the Army of Tennessee) has crafted a superbly researched volume that will appeal to
both the beginning Civil War reader as well as those already familiar with the course of fighting in the wooded terrain bordering
the Tennessee River.
His impressive research includes the judicious use of contemporary newspapers and extensive collections of unpublished letters
and diaries. He offers a lengthy discussion of the overall strategic situation that preceded the battle, a survey of the generals
and their armies and, within the notes, sharp analyses of the many controversies that Shiloh
has spawned, including assessments of previous scholarship on the battle. This first new book on Shiloh
in a generation concludes with a cogent chapter on the consequences of those two fatal days of conflict.
Shiloh: A Battlefield Guide (This Hallowed Ground: Guides to Civil War), by Mark Grimsley (Author), Steven E. Woodworth
(Author). Description: Peabody’s Battle Line, McCuller’s Field, Stuart’s Defense, the Peach Orchard, and
Hell’s Hollow—these monuments mark some of the critical moments in the battle of Shiloh but offer the visitor
only the most meager sense of what happened on the banks of the Tennessee in April 1862. This battlefield guide breathes life
into Civil War history, giving readers a clear picture of the setting at the time of engagement, who was where, and when and
how the battle progressed. Continued below…
lead the user on a one-day tour of one of the most important battlefields of the war, the guide provides precise directions
to all the key locations in a manner reflecting how the battle itself unfolded. A wealth of maps, vivid descriptions, and
careful but accessible analysis makes plain the sweep of events and the geography of the battlefield, enhancing the experience
for the serious student, the casual visitor, and the armchair tourist alike. About the Authors: Mark Grimsley is a professor of history at Ohio State University.
He is the author of And Keep Moving On: The Virginia Campaign, May–June, 1864, and the co-editor of Civilians in the
Path of War, both published by the University of Nebraska Press. Steven E. Woodworth is a professor of history at Texas Christian University.
He is the author of Chickamauga: A Battlefield Guide and Six Armies in Tennessee: The Chickamauga and Chattanooga Campaigns.