|1st Battle of Bull Run Map
|1st Battle of Manassas Map
Arlington, Va., August 4, 1861.
Lieut. Col. E. D.
Asst. Adjt. Gen., Hdqrs. of the Army, Washington, D. C.
COLONEL: I have the honor to submit the following report
of the battle of the 21st of July, near Manassas, Va. It has been delayed till this time from the inability of the subordinate
commanders to get earlier a true account of the state of their commands.
In my communication to you
of the 20th ultimo, I stated it as my intention to move that afternoon and drive the enemy from the east side of Bull Run,
so as to enable the engineers to make a sufficiently accurate reconnaissance to justify our future movements. Later in the
day they had obtained enough information of the passages across the stream to dispense with this reconnaissance, and it was
decided to move without further delay.
It had been my intention to move the several columns out on the
road a few miles on the evening of the 20th, so that they would have a shorter march in the morning; but I deferred to those
who had the greatest distance to go, and who preferred starting early in the morning and making but one move.
On the evening of the 20th ultimo my command was mostly at or near Centreville. The enemy was at or near Manassas, distant
from Centreville about seven miles to the southwest. Centreville is a village of a few houses, mostly on the west side of
a ridge running nearly north and south. The road from Centreville to Manassas Junction runs along this ridge, and crosses
Bull Run about three miles from the former place. The Warrenton turnpike, which runs nearly east and west, goes over this
ridge through the village, and crosses Bull Run about four miles from it, Bull Run having a course between the crossings from
northwest to southeast.
The First Division (Tyler's) was stationed as follows: One brigade on the north
side of the Warrenton turnpike and on the eastern slope of the Centreville ridge; two brigades on the same road and a mile
and a half in advance to the west of the ridge; and one brigade on the road from Centreville to Manassas where it crosses
Bull Run at Blackburn's Ford, where General Tyler had the engagement of the 18th ultimo.
Division (Hunter's) was on the Warrenton turnpike, one mile east of Centreville.
The Third Division
(Heintzelman's) was on a road known as the old Braddock road, which comes into Centreville from the southeast about a mile
and a half from the village.
The Fifth Division (Miles') was on the same road with the Third Division,
and between it and Centreville.
A map, which is herewith, marked A, will show these positions better
than I describe them.
Friday night a train of subsistence arrived, and on Saturday its contents were
ordered to be issued to the command, and the men required to have three days' rations in their haversacks. (See appendix herewith,
Saturday orders (copy herewith, marked c) were issued for the available force to march.
As reported to you in my letter of the 19th ultimo, my personal reconnaissance of the roads to the south had shown that it
was not practicable to carry out the original plan of turning the enemy's position on their right. The affair of the 18th
at Blackburn's Ford showed he was too strong at that point for us to force a passage there without great loss, and if we did,
that it would bring us in front of his strong position at Manassas, which was not desired.
was that the stone bridge over which the Warrenton road crossed Bull Run to the west of Centreville was mined, defended by
a battery in position, and the road on his side of the stream impeded by a heavy abatis. The alternative was, therefore, to
turn the extreme left of his position.
Reliable information was obtained of an undefended ford about
three miles above the bridge, there being another ford between it and the bridge, which was defended. It was therefore determined
to take the road to the upper ford, and, after crossing, to get behind the forces guarding the lower ford and the bridge,
and after occupying the Warrenton road east of the bridge to send out a force to destroy the railroad at or near Gainesville,
and thus break up the communication between the enemy's forces at Manassas and those in the Valley of Virginia before Winchester,
which had been held in check by Major-General Patterson.
Brigadier-General Tyler was directed to move
with three of his brigades on the Warrenton road, and commence cannonading the enemy's batteries, while Hunter's division,
moving after him, should, after passing a little stream called Cub Run, turn to the right and north, and move by a wood road
around to the upper ford, and then turn south and get behind the enemy; Colonel Heintzelman's division to follow Hunter's
as far as the turning-off place to the lower ford, where he was to cross after the enemy should have been driven out by Hunter's
division; the Fifth Division (Miles') to be in reserve on the Centreville ridge.
I had felt anxious
about the road from Manassas by Blackburn's Ford to Centreville along this ridge, fearing that, whilst we should be in force
to the front and endeavoring to turn the enemy's position, we ourselves should be turned by him by this road. For if he should
once obtain possession of this ridge, which overlooks all the country to the west to the foot of the spurs of the Blue Ridge,
we should have been irretrievably cut off and destroyed. I had, therefore, directed this point to be held in force, and sent
an engineer to extemporize some field works to strengthen the position.
The Fourth Division (Runyon's)
had not been brought to the front farther than to guard our communications by way of Vienna and the Orange and Alexandria
Railroad. His advanced regiment was about seven miles in rear of Centreville.
The divisions were ordered
to march at 2.30 o'clock a.m., so as to arrive on the ground early in the day, and thus avoid the heat which is to be expected
at this season. There was delay in the First Division getting out of its camp on the road, and the other divisions were, in
consequence, between two and three hours behind the time appointed--a great misfortune, as events turned out. The wood road
leading from the Warrenton turnpike to the upper ford was much longer than we counted upon, the general direction of the stream
being oblique to the road and we having the obtuse angle on our side.
General Tyler commenced with his
artillery at 6.30 a.m., but the enemy did not reply, and after some time it became a question whether he was in any force
in our front, and if he did not intend himself to make an attack, and make it by Blackburn's Ford. After firing several times,
and obtaining no response, I held one of Heintzelman's brigades in reserve, in case we should have to send any troops back
to re-enforce Miles' division. The other brigades moved forward as directed in the general order.
reaching the ford at Sudley Springs, I found part of the leading brigade of Hunter's division (Burnside's) had crossed, but
the men were slow in getting over, stopping to drink. As at this time the clouds of dust from the direction of Manassas indicated
the immediate approach of a large force, and fearing it might come down on the head of the column before the division could
all get over and sustain it, orders were sent back to the heads of regiments to break from the column, and come for-ward separately
as fast as possible.
Orders were sent by an officer to the reserve brigade of Heintzelman's division
to come by a nearer road across the fields, and an aide-de-camp sent to Brigadier-General Tyler to direct him to press forward
his attack, as large bodies of the enemy were passing in front of him to attack the division which had crossed over.
The ground between the stream and the road leading from Sudley Springs south, and over which Burnside's brigade marched, was,
for about a mile from the ford, thickly wooded, whilst on the right of the road for about the same distance the country was
divided between fields and woods. About a mile from the ford the country on both sides of the road is open, and for nearly
a mile farther large rolling fields extend down to the Warrenton turnpike, which crosses what became the field of battle,
through the valley of a small water-course, a tributary of Bull Run.
Shortly after the leading regiment
of the First Brigade reached this open space, and whilst the others and the Second Brigade were crossing to the front and
right, the enemy opened his fire, beginning with artillery and following it up with infantry.
brigade (Burnside's) had to sustain this shock for a short time without support, and did it well. The battalion of regular
infantry was sent to sustain it, and shortly afterwards the other corps of Porter's brigade and a regiment detached from Heintzelman's
division to the left forced the enemy back far enough to allow Sherman's and Keyes' brigades of Tyler's division to cross
from their position on the Warrenton road.
These drove the right of the enemy (understood to have been
commanded by Beauregard) from the front of the field, and out of the detached woods, and down to the road, and across it,
up the slopes on the other side. Whilst this was going on, Heintzelman's division was moving down the field to the stream
and up the road beyond. Beyond the Warrenton road, and to the left of the road down which our troops had marched from Sudley
Springs, is a hill with a farm house on it. Behind this hill the enemy had early in the day some of his most annoying batteries
planted. Across the road from this hill was another hill, or rather elevated ridge or table land. The hottest part of the
contest was for the possession of this hill with a house on it.
The force engaged here was Heintzelman's
division, Willcox's and Howard's brigades on the right, supported by part of Porter's brigade and the cavalry under Palmer,
and Franklin's brigade of Heintzelman's division, Sherman's brigade of Tyler's division in the center and up the road, whilst
Keyes' brigade of Tyler's division was on the left, attacking the batteries near the stone bridge. The Rhode Island Battery
of Burnside's brigade also participated in this attack by its fire from the north of the turnpike. The enemy was understood
to have been commanded by J. E. Johnston.
Ricketts' battery, which did such effective service and played
so brilliant a part in this contest, was, together with Griffin's battery, on the side of the hill, and became the object
of the special attention of the enemy, who succeeded (our officers mistaking one of his regiments for one of our own, and
allowing it to approach without firing upon it) in disabling the battery, and then attempted to take it. Three times was he
repulsed by different corps in succession and driven back, and the guns taken by hand (the horses being killed) and pulled
away. The third time it was supposed by us all that the repulse was final, for he was driven entirely from the hill, so far
beyond it as not to be in sight, and all were certain the day was ours. He had before this been driven nearly a mile and a
half, and was beyond the Warrenton road, which was entirely in our possession from the stone bridge westward, and our engineers
were just completing the removal of the abatis across the road to allow our re-enforcements (Schenck's brigade and Ayres'
battery) to join us.
The enemy was evidently disheartened and broken. But we had then been fighting
since 10.30 o'clock in the morning, and it was after 3 o'clock in the afternoon. The men had been up since 2 o'clock in the
morning, and had made what to those unused to such things seemed a long march before coming into action, though the longest
distance gone over was not more than 9½ miles; and though they had three days' provisions served out to them the day before,
many, no doubt, either did not get them, or threw them away on the march or during the battle, and were therefore without
food. They had done much severe fighting. Some of the regiments which had been driven from the hill in the first two attempts
of the enemy to keep possession of it had become shaken, were unsteady, and had many men out of the ranks.
It was at this time that the enemy's re-enforcements came to his aid from the railroad train (understood to have just arrived
from the valley with the residue of Johnston's army). They threw themselves in the woods on our right, and opened a fire of
musketry on our men, which caused them to break and retire down the hill-side. This soon degenerated into disorder, for which
there was no remedy. Every effort was made to rally them, even beyond the reach of the enemy's fire, but in vain. The battalion
of regular infantry alone moved up the hill opposite to the one with the house, and there maintained itself until our men
could get down to and across the Warrenton turnpike on the way back to the position we occupied in the morning. The plain
was covered with the retreating groups, and they seemed to infect those with whom they came in contact. The retreat soon became
a rout, and this soon degenerated still further into a panic.
Finding this state of affairs was beyond
the efforts of all those who had assisted so faithfully during the long and hard day's work in gaining almost the object of
our wishes, and that nothing remained on that field but to recognize what we could no longer prevent, I gave the necessary
orders to protect their withdrawal, begging the men to form a line, and offer the appearance, at least, of organization and
They returned by the fords to the Warrenton road, protected, by my order, by Colonel Porter's
force of regulars. Once on the road, and the different corps coming together in small parties, many without officers, they
became intermingled, and all organization was lost.
Orders had been sent back to Miles' division for
a brigade to move forward and protect this retreat, and Colonel Blenker's brigade was detached for this purpose, and was ordered
to go as far forward as the point where the road to the right left the main road.
By referring to the
general order it will be seen that while the operations were to go on in front, an attack was to be made at Blackburn's Ford
by the brigade (Richardson's) stationed there. A reference to his report, and to that of Major Hunt, commanding the artillery,
will show that this part of the plan was well and effectively carried out. It succeeded in deceiving the enemy for considerable
time and in keeping in check a part of his force. The fire of the artillery at this point is represented as particularly destructive.
At the time of our retreat, seeing great activity in this direction, much firing, and columns of dust, I became anxious for
this place, fearing if it were turned or forced the whole stream of our retreating mass would be captured or destroyed.
After providing for the protection of the retreat by Porter's and Blenker's brigades, I repaired to Richardson's, and found
the whole force ordered to be stationed for the holding of the road from Manassas, by Blackburn's Ford, to Centreville, on
the march, under orders from the division commander, for Centreville. I immediately halted it, and ordered it to take up the
best line of defense across the ridge that their then position admitted of; and subsequently, taking in person the command
of this part of the Army, I caused such disposition of the forces, which had been added to by the First and Second New Jersey
and the De Kalb Regiments, ordered up from Runyon's reserve before going forward, as would best serve to check the enemy.
The ridge being held in this way, the retreating current passed slowly through Centreville to the rear. The enemy followed
us from the ford as far as Cub Run, and, owing to the road becoming blocked up at the crossing, caused us much damage there,
for the artillery could not pass, and several pieces and caissons had to be abandoned. In the panic the horses hauling the
caissons and ammunition were cut from their places by persons to escape with, and in this way much confusion was caused, the
panic aggravated, and the road encumbered. Not only were pieces of artillery lost, but also many of the ambulances carrying
By sundown most of our men had gotten behind Centreville ridge, and it became a question
whether we should or not endeavor to make a stand there. The condition of our artillery and its ammunition, and the want of
food for the men, who had generally abandoned or thrown away all that had been issued the day before, and the utter disorganization
and consequent demoralization of the mass of the Army, seemed to all who were near enough to be consulted--division and brigade
commanders and staff--to admit of no alternative but to fall back; the more so as the position at Blackburn's Ford was then
in the possession of the enemy, and he was already turning our left.
On sending the officers of the
staff to the different camps, they found, as they reported to me, that our decision had been anticipated by the troops, most
of those who had come in from the front being already on the road to the rear, the panic with which they came in still continuing
and hurrying them along.
At -- o'clock the rear guard (Blenker's brigade) moved, covering the retreat,
which was effected during the night and next morning. The troops at Fairfax Station, leaving by the cars, took with them the
bulk of the supplies which had been sent there. My aide-de-camp, Major Wadsworth, staid at Fairfax Court-House till late in
the morning, to see that the stragglers and weary and worn-out soldiers were not left behind.
herewith the reports of the several division and brigade commanders, to which I refer for the conduct of particular regiments
and corps, and a consolidated return of the killed, wounded, and missing, marked D. From the latter it will be seen that our
killed amounted to 19 officers and 462 non-commissioned officers and privates, and our wounded to 64 officers and 947 non-commissioned
officers and privates. Many of the wounded will soon be able to join the ranks, and will leave our total of killed and disabled
from further service under 1,000.
The return of the missing is very inaccurate, the men supposed to
be missing having fallen into other regiments and gone to Washington; many of the zouaves to New York. In one brigade the
number originally reported at 616 was yesterday reduced to 174. These reductions are being made daily. In a few days a more
correct return can be made.
Of course nothing accurate is known of the loss of the enemy. An officer
of their forces, coming from them with a flag, admitted 1,800 killed and wounded, and other information shows this to be much
under the true number.
The officer commanding the Eleventh New York (Zouaves) and Colonel Heintzelman
say that the returns of that regiment cannot be relied on, as many there reported among the casualties have absented themselves
since their return, and have gone to New York.
Among the missing are reported many of our surgeons,
who remained in attendance on our wounded, and were, against the rules of modern warfare, made prisoners.
The issue of this hard-fought battle, in which certainly our troops lost no credit in their conflict on the field with an
enemy ably commanded, superior in numbers, who had but a short distance to march, and who acted on his own ground on the defensive,
and always under cover, whilst our men were of necessity out on the open fields, should not prevent full credit being given
to those officers and corps whose services merited success if they did not attain it.
To avoid repetition
I will only mention here the names of those not embraced in the reports of division and brigade commanders. I beg to refer
to their reports for the names of those serving under their immediate orders, desiring that on this subject of persons, &c.,
they be considered as part of my own.
I claim credit for the officers of my staff and for those acting
as such during the day. They did everything in their power, exposing themselves freely when required, and doing all that men
could do, communicating orders, guiding the columns, exhorting the troops, rallying them when broken, and providing for them
the best the circumstances admitted.
They are as follows:
First Lieut. H.
W. Kingsbury, Fifth Artillery, A, D.C.
Maj. Clarence S. Brown, New York Militia, volunteer A.D.C. Maj. James S. Wadsworth,
New York Militia, volunteer A.D.C.
The latter (who does me the honor to be on my personal staff) had a horse shot under
him in the hottest of the fight.
Capt. James B. Fry, assistant adjutant-general.
Capt. O. H. Tillinghast, assistant
quartermaster, who discharged alone the important and burdensome duties of his department with the Army, and who was mortally
wounded whilst acting with the artillery, to which he formerly belonged, and in which he was deeply interested.
F. Clarke, Subsistence Department, chief of subsistence department.
Major Myer, Signal Officer, and Maj. Malcolm McDowell,
who acted as aides.
Surg. W. S. King and Assistant Surgeon Magruder, Medical Department.
Maj. J. G. Barnard, Engineer,
and senior of his department with the Army, who gave me most important aid.
First Lieut. Fred. E. Prime, Engineer.
A. W. Whipple, First Lieut. H. L. Abbot, and Second Lieut. H. S. Putnam, Topographical Engineers.
Maj. W. F. Barry, Fifth
Artillery, chief of artillery.
Lieut. Geo. C. Strong, ordnance officer.
Maj. W. H. Wood, Seventeenth Infantry, acting
Second Lieut. Guy V. Henry, who joined me on the field, and was of service as an aide-de-camp.
The following officers commanded divisions and brigades, and in the several places their duty called them did most effective
service and behaved in the most gallant manner:
Tyler, Connecticut Volunteers.
Col. David Hunter, Third Cavalry, severely wounded at the head of his division.
S. P. Heintzelman, Seventeenth Infantry, wounded in the arm while leading his division into action on the hill.
Schenck, Ohio Volunteers, commanding Second Brigade, First Division.
Col. E. D. Keyes, Eleventh Infantry, commanding First
Brigade, First Division.
Col. W. B. Franklin, Twelfth Infantry, First Brigade, Third Division.
Col. W. T. Sherman, Thirteenth
Infantry, commanding Third Brigade, First Division.
Col. Andrew Porter, Sixteenth Infantry, commanding First Brigade, Second
Col. A. E. Burnside, Rhode Island Volunteers, commanding Second Brigade, Second Division.
Col. O. B. Willcox,
Michigan Volunteers, commanding Second Brigade, Third Division, who was wounded and taken prisoner whilst on the hill in the
hottest of the fight.
Col. O. O. Howard, Maine Volunteers, commanding Third Brigade, Third Division.
Col. I. B. Richardson,
Michigan Volunteers, commanding Fourth Brigade, First Division.
Colonel Blenker, New York Volunteers, commanding First
Brigade, Fifth Division.
Colonel Davies, New York Volunteers, commanding Second Brigade, Fifth Division.
As my position may warrant, even if it does not call for, some explanation of the causes, as far as they can be seen, which
led to the results herein stated, I trust it may not be considered out of place if I refer, in a few words, to the immediate
antecedents of the battle.
When I submitted to the General-in-Chief, in compliance with his verbal instructions,
the plan of operations and estimate of force required, the time I was to proceed to carry it into effect was fixed for the
8th of July (Monday).
Every facility possible was given me by the General-in-Chief and heads of the
administrative departments in making the necessary preparations. But the regiments, owing, I was told, to want of transportation,
came over slowly. Many of them did not come across until eight or nine days after the time fixed upon, and went forward without
my ever seeing them and without having been together before in a brigade.
The sending re-enforcements
to General Patterson by drawing off the wagons was a further and unavoidable cause of delay. Notwithstanding the herculean
efforts of the Quartermaster-General, and his favoring me in every possible way, the wagons for ammunition, subsistence, &c.,
and the horses for the trains and for the artillery, did not all arrive for more than a week after the time appointed to move.
I was not even prepared as late as the 15th ultimo, and the desire I should move became great, and it was wished I should
not, if possible, delay longer than Tuesday, the 16th ultimo. When I did set out on the 16th I was still deficient in wagons
for subsistence, but I went forward, trusting to their being procured in time to follow me.
thus hurriedly gotten together, with horses, wagons, drivers, and wagon-masters all new and unused to each other, moved with
difficulty and disorder, and was the cause of a day's delay in getting the provisions forward, making it necessary to make
on Sunday the attack we should have made on Saturday.
I could not, with every exertion, get forward
with the troops earlier than we did. I wished them to go to Centreville the second day, which would have taken us there on
the 17th, and enabled us, so far as they were concerned, to go into action on the 19th instead of the 21st; but when I went
forward from Fairfax Court-House beyond Germantown to urge them forward, I was told it was impossible for the men to march
farther. They had only come from Vienna, about six miles, and it was not more than six and one-half miles farther to Centreville,
in all a march of twelve and one-half miles; but the men were foot-weary, not so much, I was told, by the distance marched,
as by the time they had been on foot, caused by the obstructions in the road and the slow pace we had to move to avoid ambuscades.
The men were, moreover, unaccustomed to marching, their bodies not in condition for that kind of work, and not used to carrying
even the lead of "light marching order."
We crossed Bull Run with about 18,000 men of all arms, the
Fifth Division (Miles') and Richardson's brigade on the left at Blackburn's Ford and Centreville, and Schenck's brigade of
Tyler's division on the left of the road near the stone bridge, not participating in the main action. The numbers opposed
to us have been variously estimated. I may safely say, and avoid even the appearance of exaggeration, that the enemy brought
up all he could which were not kept engaged elsewhere. He had notice of our coming on the 17th, and had from that time until
the 21st to bring up whatever he had.
It is known that in estimating the force to go against Manassas
I engaged not to have to do with the enemy's forces under Johnston, then kept in check in the valley by Major General Patterson,
or those kept engaged by Major-General Butler, and I knew every effort was made by the General-in-Chief that this should be
done, and that even if Johnston joined Beauregard, it should be because he would be driven in and <325>followed by General
Patterson. But, from causes not necessary for me to refer to, even if I knew them all, this was not done, and the enemy was
free to assemble from every direction in numbers only limited by the amount of his railroad rolling-stock and his supply of
provisions. To the forces, therefore, we drove in from Fairfax Court-House, Fairfax Station, Germantown, and Centreville,
and those under Beauregard at Manassas, must be added those under Johnston from Winchester, and those brought up by Davis
from Richmond and other places at the South, to which is to be added the levy en masse ordered by the Richmond authorities,
which was ordered to assemble at Manassas. What all this amounted to I cannot say; certainly much more than we attacked them
I could not, as I have said, move earlier or push on faster, nor could I delay. A large and the
best part, so considered, of my forces were three-months volunteers, whose terms of service were about expiring, but who were
sent forward as having long enough to serve for the purpose of the expedition.
On the eve of the battle
the Fourth Pennsylvania Regiment of Volunteers and the battery of Volunteer Artillery of the Eighth New York Militia, whose
term of service expired, insisted on their discharge. I wrote to the regiment as pressing a request as I could pen, and the
honorable Secretary of War, who was at the time on the ground, tried to induce the battery to remain at least five days, but
in vain. They insisted on their discharge that night. It was granted; and the next morning, when the Army moved forward into
battle, these troops moved to the rear to the sound of the enemy's cannon.
In the next few days, day
by day I should have lost ten thousand of the best armed, drilled, officered, and disciplined troops in the Army. In other
words, every day which added to the strength of the enemy made us weaker. In conclusion, I desire to say in reference to the
events of the 21st ultimo, that the general order for the battle to which I have referred was, with slight modifications,
literally conformed to; that the corps were brought over Bull Run in the manner proposed, and put into action as before arranged,
and that, up to late in the afternoon, every movement ordered was carrying us successfully to the object we had proposed before
starting--that of getting to the railroad leading from Manassas to the valley of Virginia, and going on it far enough to break
up and destroy the communication, and interpose between the forces under Beauregard and those under Johnston; and could we
have fought a day--yes, a few hours--sooner, there is everything to show that we should have continued successful, even against
the odds with which we contended.
I have the honor
to be, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,
|1st Battle of Bull Run Map
|1st Battle of Manassas Map